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Petr challenges the remedy provided in a con-

SUMMARY:

sent decree entered in a Title VII action
of

-

minority

remedy

firefighters

exceeds

the

and

statutory

available in a coercive action.

bet~en

the City on
restrictions

the
on

an association

grounds that the
judicial

relief

-2(

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

The Vanguards of Cleveland,

an association of black and hispanic firefighters
City,

ern~loyed

by the

brought a class action alleging, inter al i a, that the City

discriminated against

minorities with regard

to promotion prac-

tices in the fire department.
The City and the vanguards then began to negotiate a settlemen t.

During

Lambros)
the

these

negotiations,

the

d ist.

granted petr's motion to intervene.

vanguards

filed

a

proposed consent

ct.

(ND Ohio,

J.

Five months later,

decree with

the court.

The court held evidentiary hearings to consider petr's objections
to

the decree

and urged the parties

to negotiate further.

The

Vanguards ultimately submitted another consent decree negotiated
between themselves and the City.

Petr's elected leadership orig-

l

inally approved the decree,

but the membership refused to accept

the ag reem en t.
The

decree

there had

contained

both

an

admission

by

the

been a history of discrimination in the

City

that

fire depart-

ment's hiring and promotion practices, and an affirmative action
plan

to

(to

last

remedy the effects of those practices.
through 1987),

all minority

.._

1981 promotional examination are

next higher rank.

/I

firefighters who passed a
\\

-----

tequired

-

Under the plan,

to be promoted to the

The promotions are to be made on the basis of

-

one non-minority to one minority appointee, based on the relative
eligible

list

rankj_ng

of

the

individuals.

tions were ordered for the next two years, and from the elig1bilj

ity lists compiled from these test results, the City is required
to maintain r-uota

l ~of

minority representation.

-.j-

.(

/

The

dist.

---

court

found

promotions"

ct.

"a
in

adopted

the

proposed

historical

pattern of

the City's

fire

decree 's affirmative

consent

racial discr·i1mination

department,

ac tion plan wa s

The

pecree.

not

and

ruled

that

an unreasonable

in
the

remedy

in light of this determination.

'T'he ~ 6

affirmed.

The majority

"reasonably related to the obi_.ectiv_:
nation"

and

"fair

and

reasonable

i

to

found

the plan to be both

remedying prior

~crimi

non-minorities who may be

~

affected by it."

Op., AlO.

The court noted that the plan estab-

lishes only "relatively modest goals," does not require the City
either

--

to hire unqualified minority firefighters or to discharge

--

any non-minority firefighters and

is of short duration; an ind i -

cation of its remedial nature. Id. at All.
The court also

found that Firefighters Local Union No. 1784

v. Stotts, 104 s.ct. 2576

(1984)

had no effect on this case.
First,

court distinguished Stotts on two grounds.
Stotts

abrogated

a

valid

non-minority workers.

seniority

Here,

system

the City

rights.
to

ignore

impermissible.
court.

This

More

the plan

in

the detriment of

the consent decree expressly main-

tains the benefits of seniority and does
nior i ty

to

The

importantly,

not interfere with se-

the court in Stotts ordered

its seniority system;

an

order

found

to be

Here, the City agreed to the plan adopted by the
is crucial because the

relevant sections of Title

VII merely limit the court's power to award certain relief; they
do not make any conduct illegal.

"[Title VII] does not for bid an

employer from engaging in certain actions but rather limits what
an employer may be forced to do."

rd. at Al6.

-4Finally, although recognizing that the Court had been "somewhat ambiguous on this point," the CA6

:1

found no thing in Stotts

to forbid a consent decree from providing remedies in excess of
those that could be ordered by a court in a purely coercive action under 'T"itle VII.
a

sub

silento

Weber, 443
ly

u.s.

to adopt

To read Stotts otherwise

overruling

of

United

would amount to

Steelworkers of America v.

193 (1979) which permitted an employer voluntari-

a reasonable plan to

increase minority employment,

even at the expense of non-minority seniority rights.
J. Kennedy dissented.

She noted that the premise of Stotts

was that Title VII does not empower a court to order relief based
on mere membership

in the dis advantaged class;

relief

is

to be

limited only to those who have been the actual victims of illegal
discrimination.

The consent decree in the present case, however,

provides relief to many firefighters who have not been victims of
past discrimination.
the court and
exceeded the

Given that a consent decree is an order of

not a purely voluntary action, the dist. ct. here
limits of

its

remedial powers in exactly

fashion as the lower court in Stotts.
the
able

relief granted pursuant
in a coercive action is

This

incongruity

the same
bet~en

to a consent decree and that availnot supported by Stotts or by the

language and legislative history of Title VII.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the dist. ct.'s remedy is

inconsistent with both Title VII and Stotts.
that

under

Title VII,

a court may only order

Stotts makes clear
relief for

those

individuals who have been actual victims of past discrimination.
The CA here, by finding that the plan was merely "voluntary ac-

r

-~-

I

tion," avoided this limitation, and approved relief that benefits
minorities based solely on their membership in the 4 isadvantaged
class.

A consent judgment is not purely voluntary action, as the

--

court enters an order and retains jurisdiction _in order to ensure
compliance.

Moreover, even if the case does involve only volun-

tary action, Title VII still limits an employer's ability to promote minorities at the expense of non-minority employees.
bet~en

Resp City argues that the CA6's distinction

orders and consent decrees is consistent with Stotts.
guards

argues

that

the

City's adoption of

coercive
Resp Van-

the plan was

a corn-

pletely voluntary action,

and as such, is consistent with Weber.

Even

volun~ y

if

ordered

the
by

plan

is

the dist.

r;g_t
ct.,

to-date,

action,

however,

the

has only benefited

relief

minority

!

employees

who

actually

have

been

victims

of

discrimination;

Sto t.ts has rot been violated.
The United States as amicus curaie urges the Court to grant
cert in order to
for

clarify

Stotts stands

the proposition that a court in a Title VII action may not

award

af f irrnat i ve

relief

cent third parties.
by

the meaning of Stotts.

holding

abridged,
c rees.

or

that

to no n-v ict i rns

at the expense of in no-

Too many CA's are avoiding Stotts, however,
it

only

by finding

applies

that

it

when

does

seniority

not apply

Both d ist i net ions are improper,

to

rights

are

consent de-

and the Court must ex-

plain this in order to prevent future improper rulings.
4.

'

tion:
must

DISCUSSION:

This

case essentially involves one ques-

whether the remedy provided in a Title VII consent decree
conform

to

the

restrictions

on

judicial

relief

otherwise

-b-

.'

applicable in Title VII cases?

The

issue

is impor,tant, but

is

not cert worthy at this time.
Stotts provides the origins of the debate over this issue.
The question there was

"whether the district court exceeded its

powers in entering an injunction requiring white employees to be
laid off,

when

have called for
ity."
each

the otherwise applicable seniority
the

layoff of black employees with less senior-

104 s.ct. at 2585 (footnotes omitted).
of

the

CA's

system would

rationales

for

upholding

The court rejected
the

injunction,

and

held that the district court had exceeded its powers.
The

CA held that such

an injunction was proper because

did no more than enforce the terms of a consent decree.

it

In re-

jecting this analysis, the Court stated that the "scope of a con/

sent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by
reference

to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the par-

ties to it or by what might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation."
Id. at 2586 (citations omitted).

Because the consent decree made

no mention of layoffs or demotions, the Court concluded that the
express terms of

the decree itself negated theCA's reliance on

this "specific performance" approach
'!he CA also held that the injunction was proper as a means
to effectuate the strong policy favoring voluntary settlement of
Title VII actions.

The CA reasoned that "[ i] t would be incongru-

ous to hold that the use of the preferred means of resolving an
employment discrimination action decreases the power of a court
to

order

relief

which

vindicates

the

policies

embodied

within

-7Title VII .... "

104 s.ct. at 2588.

The Court dismissed this ra-

tionale because it "overstate[d) the authority of th ,i trial court

r to]

'

impose []

as

an

adjunct

of

settlement

something

that

could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and the
plaintiffs proved
existed."

that

a

pattern

or practice of discrimination

Id.

In dissent, Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall) disagreed with this portion of the majority's opinion:
The Court's analysis seems to be premised on
the view that a consent decree cannot provide
relief that could not be obtained at trial.
• •• I
do not mean imply that I accept this premise as
correct.
This Court has explained that Congress intended to encourage voluntary settlement
of Title VII suits, and cooperative private efforts to eliminate the lingering effects of past
discrimination.
It is by no means clear, therefore, that the permissible scope of relief available under a consent decree is the same as could
be ordered by a court after a finding of liability at trial.
104 s.ct. at 2605 n.9

(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omit-

ted) •
Similarly, ,Justice Stevens in his coocurring opinion noted:
The Court seems to suggest that a consent decree cannot authorize anything that would not
constitute permissible relief under Title VII.
I
share Justice Blackmun 's doubts as to whether
this is the correct test • . • . The Court itself
acknowledges that the administration of if a consent decree must be tested by the four corners of
the decree, and not by the what might have been
ordered had respondents prevailed on the merits,
which makes its subsequent discussion of Title
VII all the more puzzling.
Id. at 2594-2595 n.3

(Stevens, J. coocurring) (citations omitted).

In response to these comments, the majority replied:

-o-

The dissent seems to suggest, and Justic~ Stevens expre ssly states, that 'l'itle VII is irrelevant in determining whether the District Court acted proper l/1y in modifying the consent decree.
However,
•.•
~ he
District
Court's authority to impose a modification of a decree is
not wholly dependent on the decree.
'[T]he District
Court's autho r ity to adopt a consent comes only from th e
statute which the decree is in tended to enforce, ' not
from the parties' consent to the decree . . . . [A] district
court cannot enter a disputed modification of a consent
decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting order is
inconsistent with that statute. ·
rd. at 2587 n.9 (citations omitted).
Stotts dealt with the power of a court to modify a consent
judg~

clear

th ~ ion

over

whether

Stotts

also

C:,f

It is

o; e of parties.

requires

that

adoption of

thus una

consent

decree in a Title VII action be limited by the remedies available
under that statute.
(

Such a reading of Stotts would put that case

in conflict with Weber, where the Court ruled that Title VII does
not forbid

private employers from voluntarily entering

into af-

firmative action plans to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in
employment

categories.

For

this

reason,

all of

the CA's

that

have addressed this issue, including the CA6 in the present case,
have

held

Deveraux
TUrner v.

that
v.

Stotts

Geary,

No.

does

not

83-1345

apply
at

to

17-18

Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 824-825

consent decrees.
(CAl

June

(CAll 1985);

24,

See

1985);

EEOC v. Local

6 3 8 , 7 5 3 F . 2d 11 7 2 , 11 8 5-8 6 (CA 2 19 8 5) .
The question presented
to be addressed.

Moreover,

in this case

is important and needs

the case provides the court with an

opportunity to resolve in the Title VII context the same question
thay
in
'---....

it has chosen

Wygant v.

to answer under the the fourtePnth amendment

Jackson School Board,

granted, No. 84-1340 (April 15, 1984).

746

F.2d

1152

(CA6),

cert.

These reasons support the

-9-

·r

Court's granting cert in this case.
given that

On the other hand, however,
I

the Court decided Stotts so recently and ,,j that all of

the CA's faced with the question have uniformly interpreted the
decision

in the same manner,

grant cert at this time.

I

see no

reason for

the Court

to

Should a conflict develop between the

circuits, the Court can then step in both to resolve the dispute
and to further explain its decision in Stotts.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:
There

is

I recommend denial.
a response

and an amicus brief filed by the

United States.

August 19, 1985

j'

Schultz

Opin in petn.

0G

rbs

02/21/86

~
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

~

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

February 21, 1986

From: Bob
No. 84-1999
LOCAL NUMBER 93,
AFL-CIO,

C. L. C.

v.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS,

CITY OF CLEVELAND,

et

al,

and VANGUARDS OF

CLEVELAND

Cert to CA6, set for argument Tuesday, February 25, 1986
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a

judgment entered with the consent of a defendant

public employer in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 may award racial preferences in promotions to
persons who are not actual victims of the employer's discrimina"--.....

t ion.

'•

I

'·
,·;

..
"'·

7

•

1

Whether a consent judgment may be entereq over the objection
il

of an intervenor of right whose interests are adversel 0 affected
by the terms of the consent judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The Vanguards of Cleveland, an association of black and hispanic firefighters employed by the City,
alleging,

inter alia,

brought a class action

that the City discriminated against minor-

ities with regard to promotion practices in the fire department.
The City and the Vanguards then began to negotiate a settleDuring these negotiations, the district court (ND Ohio, J.

ment.

Lambros)

~ve ~

granted petr' s motion

Five months later,

..... ~·· oe::.::::..----·-··

the Vanguards

filed

a

proposed

consent decree with

the

court.

The court held evidentiary hearings to consider petr's objections
\____.,.,

to the decree
'---

·-

and

urged

the parties to negotiate further.

The

Vanguards ultimately submitted another consent decree negotiated
between themselves and the City.

Petr's elected leadership orig-

inally approved the decree, but the

Y/~

membership~ refused

to accept

the agreement.
The

decree

there had been a

contained

both ~n

admission

--

~d

City

that

an affirmative action

plan to remedy the effects of those practices.
through

the

history of discrimination in the fire depart-

ment's hiring and promotion practices,

(to last

by

1987) ,

Under the plan,

all minority f i ref igh ter s

who passed a

1981 promotional examination are "required" to be promoted to the
next higher rank.

The promotions are to be made on the basis of

one non-minority to one minority appointee, based on the relative
eligible

list

ranking

of

the

individuals.

Additional

exam ina-

I

k

I

tions were ordered for the next two years, anq from the ' eligibilil

i ty lists compiled

from

these

test

the City ' ~greed to

results,

promote certain percentages of minorities.
The district court adopted the proposed consent decree.
court

found

promotions"

"a

historical

pattern

in

the

fire

City's

of

racial

department,

The

discrimination
and

ruled

in

that

the

decree's affirmative action plan was not an unreasonable remedy
in light of this determination.

/

The CA6 affirmed.

The majority found

the plan to be both

"reasonably related to the objective of remedying prior discrimination"

and

"fair

affected by it."

and

reasonable

Op., AlO.

to non-minorities

who may

be

</9/p

The court noted that the plan estab-

~

lishes only "relatively modest goals," does not require the City

--

~

'--11.

either to hire unqualified minority firefighters or to d~ rge

~r .

any non-minority firefighters and is of short duration; an indi-

~"'}

----

~

cation of its remedial nature.

II.

~~
~~
~l..u(J

Id. at All.

DISCUSSION.

~

You may feel that the issue of the scope of relief permitted ~/~
by §706(g) is foreclosed by Stotts' references to §706(g) as suggesting

that only make-whole

§706 (g).

Stotts

did

say

relief

that

to victims

is permitted by

the view that a court can award

competitive seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has
actually
with

been a

victim of

illegal discrimination

the policy behind §706 (g).

is consistent

But~ did not ~

that

such a ruling was required by §706(g), which is the position that

-----------------------

the SG takes here. Further it is not absolutely clear that Stotts
~

is not somehow limited by the fact that the decree there inter-

.

'.

~~

U~

page

fered

with

a

bona

fide

seniority plan

under

§ 70 3 (h) .

I

q.

Thus, ....L
il

have considere

anew the §706 (g)

issue.

Finally,

I

db

not be-

')~
~Ad~

lieve that the SG ever makes clear the relationship between his
concept of "victim specificity" and preferential relief.

I think

that the SG's position could be read even to preclude the use of
. s~ .
flexible goals in hiring, promotion, etc, because o f h1s ~ 1ns1stence on a

remedy

being

tied only to specific victims,

need for a remedy to go no further
d iscr imina tion.

A goal,

"preferential relief."
centers

for

and

the

than needed to remedy actual

example,

could be construed

SG-5'

~

"1~ ~

~~

--~IAA-4/

to be ~ or:•· '-'""!
~

Thus, my discussion of the SG' s position ~ ~

around the concept of goals.

I

later discuss how this

k>~
v-z..c..~

case should be resolved given your views on quotas.
A. Title VII

-

Section 706(g), and particularly that provision's last sentence, is at the center of the dispute in this case and in Local
28, No. 84-1656.

It provides in pertinent part:

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may ~ in
cluae, but 1s n
1 1 e
to·, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay ... ,or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate . . . .
No order of the court shall require the admission or
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union,
or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in violation of
§2000-3(a) of this title.

k

f 7tJ "&')
L.-&.-

~'1-

~L,.,-

tPf~
,4----L •

Any discussion of this case must begin ~ith the plain lanI

The SG takes the position that the underf~ ned lan-

guage above.

intent in 1964 to disallow any

guage above makes clear Congress'

remedies that are not victim specific.

the last sentence of §706(g) does not support a reading that all

meaning

of

the

last

sentence

in

effect

reads

"No

court

shall

order the reinstatement, etc. of someone who was not discriminated against."

Respondents argue that a plain reading of the sen-

tence supports a view that "No court shall order the reinstatement, etc. of someone who was fired for a reason other than discrimination."
~

While both meanings can be derived from the words

of the sentence, the SG fails to deal with a well-taken point of
respondents,

that the sentence cannot possibly be meant to ad-

dress prospective remedies, because it speaks only of orders concerning an individual who was "refused admission, etc."
cases

where

liability

is

not

based

solely

on

Thus, in

discrimination

against named individuals, as in a case brought by an individual,
but

~mL1A

F-iitl:u;u;.

based

on

a

pattern

or

practice

of

discrimination,

against a whole class of individuals, this sentence bars a court
order only
with respect to someone "refused admission," but does
---....-.

,,

not speak to ~quitable relief that can go to other members of the

-

class.
only

A fair

those

response

refused

is that Congress must have assumed that

admission

could benefit from an

injunction,

but that is clearly not so. An injunction as in Local 28, ordering

a

union

to stop

its

discriminatory practices

benefits

all

S 6- ~
~o.d..·~..Jj

I

minorities who were not rejected but who in the future may want
il

to

apply.

I

think

respondents

have

the

better

th ~ literal

of

argument.

-

Respondents'

literal reading is bolstered by the remarks

1~

:r;:-

~
of ~

at

Representative Celler who offered the amendment adding the last

l'7tJ(,(_1)
~

sentence to §706(g):
"Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the Amendment is to
specify cause.
Here the court, for example, cannot
find any violation of the Act which is based on facts
other--and I emphasize "other"--than discrimination on
the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.
The discharge might be based for example, on incom~ekence
morals charge or theft, but the court
can o
n ider charges based on race, color, rel igion~rlgln.
TFiat 18 tile --pfl"r15bse or this
amendment.·'
Il~ Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964).

or-a

For
\.._.....-

the

sake of brevity,

discussion of

the

1972 Amendments,
they

bear

statutory

---

call,

on

a

yet I

have eliminated a several page

history of

the

1964 Act and

the

and will simply state my conclusions as to how
/1~
<
statutory construction analysis.
I --1 thinl<-t the

construction

question

is,

in

the

am left unconvinced by the SG' s

gress clearly
cases.

legislative

I

intended all

relief

end,

a

very

close/1..-~ ?-_~

argument that Con- ~

to be victim specific in

all ~ ~

e!~
~~~

The references and fights over quotas, do not in all in-

stances address the precise issue of whether relief must in all
cases be victim specific.

In addition, it is also clear that the

1964 complaints centered largely around a fear that racial imbalance per se would constitute a violation of Title VII.

I am un-

comfortable hinging a contrary holding on admittedly broad statements of the proponents, that are only awkwardly supported by the
~

plain words of the statute.

J4..e

In addition, the Ervin amendment and

I

the fact that a few courts were upholding goa+s prior to 1972 cut
marginally in favor of respondents.
Added to all this, is the fact that the CA's and the govern--------------------------~

ment itself apparently held the view that these numerical goals
were permissible for quite a

long

time .1

Indeed,

amicus NAACP

li do not think respondents are correct that all courts of
~
appeals have so held. I do not think the case they cite for the
,~- ·--~
proposition from the CAlO supports their point.
I have broken ~ ,
down somewhat the court of appeals cases relied on by respondents ~~
to determine the precise nature of the issue before the court,
~~
because in some cases that involve goals it is difficult to tell
~~
whether others who were not victims benefited. At least two
circuits have rejected the argument relative to 706(g) advanced
here. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1557 (CAS
1984) (en bane) ("at this point in the history of the fight
against discrimination, it cannot be seriously argued that there
is any insurmountable barrier to the use of goals or quotas to
eradicate the effects of past discrimination"); EEOC v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 556 F.2d 167 (CA3 1977),
cert. denied, 438 u.s. 915 (1978). Other cases have clearly
provided goals relief to those who were non-victims. United
States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (CA7 1977) (suit brought
under §§1981, 1983, 1985, Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VII;
relief justified under broad remedial powers of Title VII); Davis
v. City of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (CA9 1977) (rejecting
argument based on 703(j), and noting that decree also based on
§1981), vacated as moot, 440 u.s. 625 (1970). Rios v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 501 F.2d 622 (CA2 1974)
(goals challenged expressly under §703(j)); Boston Chapter NAACP
v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (CAl 1974) (rejecting argument advanced
under §703(j)); United States v. Masonry Contractors Association
of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (CA6 1974) (Title VII case);
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (CA8 1971) (case brought under
§1981, but analogizing to remedies proper under Title VII and
rejecting claim that presence of identified persons who have been
discriminated against is a necessary prerequisite to the
establishment of goals), cert. denied, 406 u.s. 950 (1972).
In
other cases, usually promotion cases, brought by those already in
a company or agency alleged to be discriminating, it is arguable
whether the beneficiaries of the goal were "victims" or not;
although it is clear that the cases did not require any showing
that each beneficiary of the goal could be considered a victim.
Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (CAll 1985), cert. filed No.
85-999 (case brought under §§ 1981, 1983 and Fourteenth
Amendment, but court discussed impact of Stott's title VII
holding; probably a hold for 84-1999); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678
(Footnote continued)

vf

I

legal defense

fund

in 84-1999

does

a

job of demon-

convincing

il

strating that the very consent decrees relied upon by t 'He Government

to show

how

victim specific

selves contain racial preferences.
of the CA 1 s
their

square

relief

can

of

overlooked by this Court,

them-

I do not think the assumption

that such goals are permissible,
rejection

be awarded,

an opposite

view,

and

in some cases

should

be

lightly

especially in light of the fact that

the SG here is asking for a rather remarkable reformation of existing law concerning Title VII remedies.
Such remedial remedies when properly applied are in no way ·

___ with

inconsistent
..,__,

Congress 1

enactment

of Title VII
~

"to

assure

equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina tory
~

practices

and

devices

which

have

fostered

racially

stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."

Fullilove v.

concurring).

only

448

u.s.

448,

499

!,../

(POWELL,

J.,

On a more practical level, as Amici Lawyers Commit-

tee point out,
the

Klutznick,

the use of such remedial devices may in fact be

effective

way

blatant discrimination.

in certain cases

to efficiently combat

The facts of the Local 28 case where the

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
F.2d 257 (CADC 1982) (Title VII): Chisolm v. United States Postal
Service, 665 F.2d 482 (CA4 1981) (action brought under Fifth
Amendment, §1981 and Title VII: goal relief sustained under broad
remedial powers of Title VII). Clearly the weight of authority is
that such relief is permitted, although, as noted few of the
cases specifically discuss statutory challenges based on Title
VII.
I have not looked to determine in each of the above whether
these goals were perhaps in reality quotas, but I think it is
fair to say that in a good number they would be difficult to
distinguish from the remedies at bar.

SG

describes

petitioner's

conduct

as

"contumacious,h

perhaps

il

present as stark a case as any that other uses of equitable power
that cannot be measured or strictly enforced, may, in the end, be
In addition, such prospective relief relieves both par- ~

useless.

ties of potentially costly battles over who were the actual victims

of

a

particular

practice.

Such

battles

inevitably

involve issues not easily susceptible to proof.

would

The very battle

in the briefs in this case over whether those who would benefit
from promotions
EEOC v.

are victims

American Telephone

(CA3 1977), cert. denied,
of concept of "victim").
not
~

require

their

use

or
&

not,

is

to the point.

Telegraph Co.,

u.s.

438

915

(1978)

See also

556 F.2d 167,

175

(discussing scope

To uphold the use of such remedies does
in all cases;

it does

not,

for

example,

exempt state entities such as those in this case from consti tutional constraints; and DC's are subject to review in theCA's. A
decision that

they are within the meaning of Title VII merely

means that a court may resort to them--not that it must.

Because

the SG is arguing that relief in all cases must be victim specific,

I

do not read this case--at the statutory level--as one in

which that distinction could be applied.
A perhaps more sound reading of the legislative history supports a view--very different,
the SG--that Congress wa :

I

think, from the one advanced by

c~~abo~t fquota~ a~~hey

are beyond the scope of Title VII.
your

view,

initially expressed

are unconstitutional.

This I believe comports with

in Bakke,

that mandatory quotas

A holding that Title VII does not permit

fixed

quotas

could

stern

reasonably either

f ,rorn the legislative
il

history or from the Constitution.

''\

The critical issue, in this case, then would turn on whether
this case involves a goal or a quota.

It is difficult to find in

the plan approved here

flexibility

the

requisite

that

the word

"goal" suggests. The mere fact that the DC is able to modify the
decree, upon request, does not change the fact that at any given
moment a fixed requirement is in place. It is true, on the other
hand,

that

the plan is set to terminate at some point. Perhaps

one way to distinguish goals and quotas is to consider whether
the employer has agreed to any behavior to enable him to reach a

-----------------------

goal beyond the mere agreement to try to put X number of minorities
into___a--.. given position.
...___-......_
\...._..,

Thus, for example, a flexible pro-

motion goal of 20% lieutenants might more resemble a "goal"

if

the decree requires certain steps to attain it, such as training
programs (open to all), special help classes, etc.

The plan here

seems simply to require race-conscious promoting, which arguably
makes it seem more like a quota than a goal.
that

squarely

--

obstacles.

finding

First,

that

the plan here

respondents

argue

that

I

is a quota faces
in

fact

entitled to promotion are indeed victims of past

~ Th~re

~~t

think, however,

all

of

~o

those 1-c ~

On remand, respond-

• ~... e.~
l}trLt s' would be free to argue that the quotas here benefited only
- J Y. r 4 bL-:
~~yP vi&tirns--although this raises a difficult issue in the context of

vAI"'t....JVtn .
~ unlitigated consent decrees. ( SeconJ , respondents assert, and it
does not appear

to be rebutted,

~....:.-..

discrimination. ~·~

is a fight about this in the briefs and I am not certain
this Court would want to resolve that.

Ti.V-t}

t:Tt-r..~

that in order to carry out the

-

plan

--)

the

city enlarged

department,

.-::---

so

that

the

denied a

·on at a

three or

This

four.
-------

the

total

number

number

of

have the

flexibility

in the

who ''\ would

arguabl ~be_ as

li~e

be
as

a wrinkle when one thinks of

quotas as hurting qualified whites.
about this at oral argument.

~

non-minorities

e might
simply adds

of , supervisors

It may be worth asking petr

In the end, because this does not

that you think goals ought to have,

it is

fair to call this a quota.
B. The Consent Decree Issue
Whether

you agree or disagree

that Title VI I does not bar

the type of relief in this case, you will still have to consider
problems raised by the fact that the order here was entered pursuant to a consent decree.
~

--------------------~-------

If you agree that Title VII does not

bar the type of relief here, I think that the intervention of the

-

union does not give it a veto power over the settlement.
not agreed

to do anything,

consent decree.

It has ~

and therefore is not "bound" by the

The SG contends,

in effect,

however,

union should have a veto power of any settlement here.

that

This ar-

gument is apparently premised on the SG's assertion that the
tlement

agreement

here

interfered

with

collective

rights under a contract and under statutory law.

the

set- ~~

bargaining

Of course,

the

issue was

never presented by the union,

but only by the SG on petition for rehearing below.
not rebut this.

Nor is it clear that the Memorandum does

what the SG says it does.

.

'~

The SG does

In addition, the collective bargaining agreement

is not in the record.

~
~

that ~~

was not raised in the court below, and respondent City of Cleveland contends that

~ ~
~~

Similarly, the SG's argument with re-

spect to seniority rights seems forced and
this

case

legal

into

right of

one
the

argument that the

resembling

Stotts.

union which has been

I

a~

attempt to stretch
I
Absent any p articular
impinged,

I

think the

union had a veto power over a consent decree

here loses considerable support in logic and in the cases cited
by the SG for the proposition.

In addition,

it should be clear

that permitting a veto in all cases to those who are allowed to
represent non-minorities and who intervene in actions would make
settlement of Title VII cases impossible, even in cases that do
not call for goals and race-conscious relief, as there would be
no particular reason to limit such a rule to such cases.
ly,
to

Final-

it is not so anomalous to permit an interested party merely
voice

concerns

rather

than have a

veto.

action ~~~
objectors do not
-----

In a

settlement to be approved by a district judge,

class

~

The few CAS cases relied on by the SG

have a veto, merely a say.

---.

do not state a contrary rule: rather, they recognize that a union
has a stronger right of objection when its collective bargaining
rights

are

being

interfered

Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d S67
can Horne Products Corp.,

with.

E.g.,

E.E.O.C.

v.

Safeway

(CAS 1983). But cf. Wheeler v. Ameri-

S82 F.2d 891

(CAS 1978).

to say that objectors' complaints are to be ignored:

This is not
indeed here

the CA noted that the DC permitted intervention, held two evidentiary hearings

to consider

intervenor's objections,

as well as

~

solicited written objections,

and encouraged negotiation to in-

elude the intervenor.
2. Distinguishing Voluntary and Court Ordered Plan

If you believe that the use of "qu~as" , is beyond the scope
1

{. c equires
'./J ~)
such

of Title VII because the constitution

il

a ' k onstruc-

tion of the statute, then I agree that the Court was without authority because the ultimate decree clearly violated the constitution.2

If, on the other hand, you believe that Title VII, ir-

respective of constitutional concerns,
specific relief,

then I

goals

race-conscious

or

other

bars all forms of victim

believe that a consent decree embodying
relief

would

still

be

proper.

Whatever the basis for a decision that Title VII might deny such
victim specific relief, Congress' concerns are not present when a
court is not forcing relief on a party. Consent vitiates the concern about coerced remedies.

The presence of the union in this

case does not alter the analysis; their consent would be required
~

were they to be bound by any result. They are, however, not bound
by the consent decree in the sense that they are required to undertake

any

particular

activity

or

forbear

from

any

conduct.

This does not ignore the union's interest which justified intervention because they are still free to object to the DC and on
appeal

to aspects of the consent decree that infringe their inThe consent decree thus would

terests.

be

in val ida ted only if

some substantive right of the non-minorities either under Title

7

2Arguably, there is no constitutional issue square!z presented
~~t
by~ questions presented. Below "'I r~petr r-s argument that
merely because the decree is beyond the scope of Title VII it is
invalid. To find this remedy a constitutional violation, then,
goes beyond the scope of the question presented.
In light of a I
view that Title VII should be construed to be in accord with the
constitution, it would be silly not to address the issue here.

, • • 1"

'

VII or the constitution were being violated. ,

Because ' this case
II

probably concerns a quota, it will be unnecessary to co ~sider the
constitutional

issue

of whether

a

goal permissible

under Title

VII will always be permissible under the constitution.
tion,

In addi-

the SG's view that Title VII consent decrees including any

kind of race-conscious relief are beyond the scope of the statute
ignores the practical problem that such a holding would not similarly curtail

remedies

available under 42

rectly under the Fourteenth Amendment.

u.s.c.

§1981, and di-

It may be unwise to force

litigants to use these avenues by taking away means of effective
relief under Title VII.
edies
were
~

in these

Thus, were you to conclude that the rem-

two cases were goals,

beyond the scope of Title VII,

but that even these goals
I

think that the decisions

below could be affirmed because the order was embodied in a consent decree. There is, of course, contrary language in Stotts at
n.9.
III.
Your

position

with

CONCLUSION

respect

to

statutory construction of Title VII
tional
consent

flaw.
the

Such
use of

an approach
flexible,

quotas
that

leaves

arguably
avoids

requires

a

this constitu-

to courts and parties by

temporary goals.

The task of

the

Court, were it to adopt such a view would be to begin the process
of clearly defining the difference between the two.

7?
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

February 21, 1986

Bob

No.84-1656
LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, v.
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al.

EQUAL EMPLOY-

(No. 84-1656)

Cert to CA2, set for argument Tuesday, February 25, 1986

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
(1)

a...
After general finding of discrimination against uniden1\

tified persons, may district court order race-conscious affirmative

action

program with

percentage

"goal"?

(2)

Does

reverse

discrimination violate Equal Protection Clause or constitutional

page l.

I

prohibition against Corruption of Blood?

(3~

Should c ,ivil con'1

tempt

remedies

imposed

be

declared

without due

component

without

illegal

process when they

proof

of

damages

contemp~ 1 remedies

criminal

and

include
(b)

compensatory

coercive

unrelated to contempt and without opportunity to
(4)

(a)

component

purge contempt?

Do findings of discrimination, premised upon improper stand-

ards and statistics, followed by findings of contempt of resulting orders also based upon improper standards and statistics depr ive union of due process?
pointing administrator,

(5)

Does district court order ap-

with day-to-day supervisory powers over

internal affairs of labor union,

violate union's right to self-

governance, or exceed court's power to appoint special masters?

I.

BACKGROUND.

{[) ,

Petrs include a un1on of sheet metal workers in the New York
metropolitan area
ticeship program.
--...__..

an~ts

committee responsible for

its~a~ren

__...____...,.

A majority of the union's members have tradi-

tionally come up through the apprenticeship program, a four-year
course designed to teach sheet metal skills.

A student entering

the program is indentured, and upon graduation becomes a journeyman.
This case began in 1971 when the United States filed a Title
VII

suit against petrs

to enjoin their pattern and practice of

discriminating against nonwhites
tr ict court
membership

found
in

the

in union membership.

The dis-

that petrs had purposefully denied nonwhites
union

in

violation of Title VII.

Petrs had

~·

accomplished

this goal primarily by blocking

the

I

entr~

of non-

~~

whites into the apprenticeship program through the use d f

invalid

entrance

a

school

exams,

diploma,

The district

a

requirement

and

court

inquiries
entered

action program (AAP)
other

things,

that

applicants

into applicants'

possess
arrest

high

records.

judgment and created an affirmative

as a remedy.

The petrs were ordered, among

--

to achieve a nonwhite membership "goal" of 29% by

July 1, 1981, with interim percentage goals also set.

The court

appointed a special master called an "administrator" to supervise
compliance with the AAP.
The CA2 initially affirmed the finding of a Title VII violation,

but

district
\....__...;

(RAAP)

reversed part of
court

that,

tioned.

entered

inter

a

ali a,

the

relief granted.

revised
retained

affirmative

On remand,
action

the

program

the elements previously men~1-!f£0{. _
7

A divided CA2 affirmed.

/

In April 1982, the city and state of New York moved to have
petrs held in contempt for failing to reach the RAAP's 29% goal.
The district court granted the motion,

but rather than base its

contempt order directly on failure to meet the goal, it based the
order on

(l)

underutilization of the apprenticeship program,

refusal to conduct an adequate publicity campaign,
of

a

job protection

members,

(4)

plan

that

favored

older,

(3)

(2)

adoption

and hence white,

issuance of unauthorized work permits to whites from

sister unions, and (5) failure to maintain and submit records and
reports.

The court determined that these violations of the RAAP

thwarted the achievement of the goal.

The court imposed a fine

of $150,000 to be placed in a training fund to increase nonwhite

A~P

page 4.

I

o~dered
I

membership in the union's apprenticeship program and

,.,

the

administrator to develop a plan for use of the fund.
In April 1983, New York City again instituted contempt prothis time before the RAAP' s administrator.

The administrator concluded that petrs were in contempt of

outstanding court orders requiring them to provide records of the
race and national origin of all applicants for union membership.
As a remedy, the

pay for com-

puterized record keeping and make further payments to the training

fund

that

court adopted

the

was

the administrator's

setting an amount
administrator
fund.

administrator

for

the

submitted

In September

1983,

recommendations,

training

his

developing.

The

district

but deferred

fund contribution until

proposal

outlining

the administrator

a

plan

for

the
the

submitted his pro-

posed plan, stating that the fund would be used to encourage nonwhite membership

in

the

union

and

be

financed

by the previous

fines and a $.02 per hour labor tax on union members.

The dis-

trict court issued a contempt order adopting the administrator's
proposal.
The

district

court

issued

still another contempt order

in

September 1983, this time adopting an amended affirmative action
program

(AAAP)

from 29%

that

to 29.23%

( 1)
to be

1 ished an apprentice
three-member

to

increased the nonwhite membership goal
reached by July 31,

1987,

journeyman ratio of 1: 4,

apprentice selection board,

( 4)

( 3)

(2)

estab-

created a

imposed a nonwhite

to white ratio of 1:1 for admittance into the apprenticeship program,

( 5)

permitted work on new selection procedures to be used

after

the goal was

reached,

and

(6)

incorpot;ated the 'order reil

quiring petrs to pay the costs of an advisor to rnonitoi 1 the cornputerization of the records.

The ~A2

affirmed

in most respects, and held that the AAAPO

did not violate Title VII or the Constitution.
here,

it

29.23%

is

sufficient

to

note

that

court

nonwhite membership objective was not a

but a temporary "permissible" goal.
sar ily
did,

the

For our purposes

trammel

however,

the

rights

of

ruled

that

the

permanent quota

The goals would not unnecesThe CA2,

innocent nonrninor i ties.

find that the DC had abused its discretion by re-

quiring the selection of one non-white for very white who enters
the apprenticeship program.

Judge Winter dissented.

II. DISCUSSION.
Local

28

about which

is

at

this

time

attempting

it has ever disagreed

to

raise every

in this litigation,

issue

notwi th-

standing consideration of those issues by the CA2 in earlier
cisions,

and

~

"f

~

de- J1~~

its failure to even seek certiorari of those deci-

~1-k
r')'-~

sions.

Thus, one task for the Court in this context is to deter-

mine precisely which issues it is willing to decide. I agree with

the SG and the respondents that several issues that petrs

if

the Court were

to address

them,

I

tion for
fore

The SG agrees with respondents with respect to

two of those issues.

f

~ C/lz.
~

in petr' s peti- ~

certiorari and briefed again here are not properly be-

the court.

. '.

issues raised

t'2<...L~

agree that ~

several of the contentions have no merit.
Respondents claim that three

~

attemp~

to raise in Local 28 should not now be addressed by this Court,
in any event,

~

He agrees that the initial determination of

page b.

I

Title VII liability,

and the establishment of the offipe of ad'1

ministrator are not properly before the Court because ' k hey were
imposed a decade ago and were affirmed by decisions of the Court
of Appeals after which petr did not seek certiorari. In addition,
both point out that the petitioner did not even raise these two
issues in the very court of appeals decision that it is now chalIn addition,

lenging.

both the SG and Respondent State of New

York agree that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have
been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the original contraThey

versy.

challenges
temporary
~

point

to

both

out

that

a

civil

restraining

order

the

cases

contempt
or

cited

finding

preliminary

by
and

petr
an

involved

underlying
These

injunction.

cases are irrelevant when a party violates an unappealed permanent injunction.

See NLRB v.

hood of Teamsters,
the

428 F.2d 994,

issues cannot be

that

this

Zeitz, 333

Court

u.s.

Local 282,

has

reopened
spoken

56, 68

999

I

(CA2 1970).

agree that

in this contempt proceeding,

clearly

(1948)

International Brother-

on

the

and

Maggio

issue.

v.

("It would be a disservice to the

law if we were to depart from the long-standing rule that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the
factual

basis

of

the

order

alleged

to have

legal or

been disobeyed and

thus become a retrial of the original controversy"). Accord United States
event,

v.

petr' s

little merit.

Rylander,

460

arguments
The SG and

with

u.s.

752,

respect

756-757
to

these

respondents agree with

(1983).
two

In

issues

any
have

this position.

Petr has seriously mischaracterized the basis of the initial li-

~--------------------------------

ability

holding,

and

___.....

reasonable.
1983 was

the

appointment

of

th~

administ'rator

was

il

In

not

addition,

before

the

retention of

the court below and

the Administrator

in

this Court should not

address that issue.
The Respondent, however, in addition, believes that the race
conscious 29% goal is not properly before the Court for the same
reason;

although on this score the SG disagrees because the lat-

est order after the contempt proceedings, included in the AAAPO a
new goal of 29;93% to be met by August 1987 under threat of severe

sanctions

ih

the

event

the

goal

is

not

met.

Respondent

State of New York points to language in the District Court's decision that "[t]he new goal of 29.23% essentially is the same as
the goal set
~

in 1975."

(A.

123)

Petitioners may not avoid the

effects of res judicata by challenging what is essentially a reiteration of a prior order.

I agree with the SG that this issue

is properly before the Court because the goal was modified and
appealed from below.
-----~

in finding

Finally, I think that the CA2 can be upheld

that the contempt remedies here did not convert this

into a criminal contempt proceeding requiring all the attendant
goals, and I do not think this Court should.
The
remedy

~ntral

imposed

~

issu1 in these cases revolves around the kind of
with

respect

to

race

conscious

relief.

I

have

discussed that issue in the memorandum relating to Local 93, No.
84-1999,

and

I

will

repeat

none

of

that

here.

A preliminary

issue is whether this case should not be analyzed under Title VII
because the DJ arguably imposed the goal sanction under his contempt authority.

I

think it is highly artificial to say that a

~

contempt sanction for

a

violation of

an oroer

, I

stemm1ng from a
''I

Title VII violation could go beyond what Title VII

it~elf per-

What remains, I think is to consider whether what has been ~'~~

mits.

con~ s
---- -

done here

a "goal" or a "quota."

-;;:::::,_

-;:::::.

-

As you point out in

your memo to file, there is disagreement about this below in the
CA2,

as

there

is in the briefs here.

trl-

. 'a~e:v"

0

The mere announcement by

the DC that the 29.93% is a goal does not make it one.

It seems

apparent that the only similarity that this figure has to a goal
is the
dered

fact
that

point out

---

that it is temporary.
The DC has continuously or~
it be achieved by a certain date.
Petrs in 84-1656
1\.

that

the original Order

mandatory terms,
directed
"

and

and Judgment was written in

"By July 1, 1981, Local 28 and JAC are hereby

ordered

to achieve

a

non-white percentage of

29%

Indeed the CA2 in its opinion noted that, for example, the

fund order was to terminate "when the membership goal set out"
had been achieved.

This underlines in my view the reality that
The very existence of
--threatened unless the :·goal" was met.

what was done here constitutes a quota.

------------~

-------

the

union was apparently

The

focus

of

the

remedy,

mathematical target,

if you will,

rather

dertaken to reach the goal.
calling this a goal,

that I

has

clearly

become

the

than the efforts that are being unThe only factors cutting in favor of
can discern is the

fact

that once

reached there will be no requirement that it maintained. In addition, because this is in the nature of a "hiring" quota, the im-

-

pact on innocent nonminorities is more spread around.

These fac-

tors alone, however, are probably insufficient to avoid labeling
this a quota.

f~
6-c '>

tJM.c.-...d~

~

paye

:~.

I

Similarly, the apprenticeship fund that exists for the beneil

fits

of

nonwhites

operates

certain moneys for

like a quota

in that

nonminor i ties and excludes the

for

others.

There

is

use of those

-----------

~

monies

it s'$ ts aside

no sense

that

this provision can

~--------

defended
points

as

out

being
that

akin

to

a

goal.

it would be ok

On

the other

hand,

to permit advertising

areas to target increased membership in the union.
set aside money,
i ties
the

that

fund

is

in black

Both programs

but one actually delivers a service to minor-

nonminor i ties
race

the SG

are expressly excluded

from.

Because

specific and excludes nonminorities,

you will

probably want to strike it down.

I think it is this exclusivity-

-

tionable. My only area of concern is that the fund be struck down
in a way that does not circumscribe a court's remedial power to
order an employer to take other steps to reach a legitimate goal.
My final point on quotas is a practical one,

and one that

suggests why perhaps it is understandable that the DC felt constrained to impose them.
gence,

When a court is faced with intransi-

and an employer or a union consistently fail to make any

effort to correct its statutory or constitutional violation,

it

becomes

to

increasingly

difficult,

I

measure compliance or good faith.
cal extension of

the

would

think,

for

a

court

The "quota" becomes a practi-

concept of a goal.

Put another way,

even

when a goal is used, the "goal" may invariably become the standard

by

which

compliance

with

the

Court's

wishes

is

measured.

Given this reality, I am also not quite sure that an employer or

-4!1du~
~~

I

a union might not react to a goal by feeling that indeed it is
.~

'1

something it must achieve.

'

III. CONCLUSION
The only

issue

of

any

import

remedy imposed here is valid.

in this case

is whether

the

For the reasons stated in my ac-

companying Memorandum in 84-1999, I believe that the SG is wrong
that Title VII
. . . . ._~-·-··-----·

forbids all race-conscious relief, or, to put it

~-·------

the other way,

______

'

requires
..._____ a ediscernible

~

···-

that flows from an 'nju ctive decree.
.......______ ··-·····-.. ----

..

-

victi;n for _!!_Very benefit
Because even a goal, might

be considered by some to be race-conscious relief, your view on
quotas represents a half-way point.

If you agree that the remedy ·

here constitutes a fixed and rigid quota, then you will want to
reverse the decision of the CA2.
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February 24, 1986
28 GINA-POW
84-1999

Local 93 v. City of Cleveland (CA6) (February 26)

MEMO TO BOB:
You also have 84-1656,
this

presents

case

affirmative

Local 26 v . .EEOC that- like

questions

action plans

that

as

to

the

validity

involve quotas,

where

of
the

beneficiaries of the plan are not actual victims of racial
discrimination.

In view of Mike's work on Wygant, you and

he should collaborate.
This case and
some of the briefs

Local 26 are so closely related

that

amicus brief of the AFL-CIO

(~,_the

filed in 84-1656 also addresses 84-1999.
This involves an affirmative plan, approved by the DC
and

CA6,

with

respect

to

promotions

to

positions

"officer" within the Firefighters Union in Cleveland.
plan

itself,

a

rather

complicated one,

pages A 4-7 of the opinion of CA6.
plan

enough

however,

to

was clear:

of minorities
imbalance
officer

describe

If

in

set

forth

The
on

I have not studied the
detail.

Its

purpose,

to assure the preferential promotion

to officer rank

between

level.

it

is

of

whites
I

and

to correct a
racial

under stand

the

rather clear

minorities

at

plan correctly,

the
it

"•

fairly
rrere

can

be

"goals",

viewed

as

providing

and

without

"quotas"

regard

to

rather

proof

than

of

any

discrimination against the minority firefighters who will
be

promoted

the

plan

has

an

adverse

impact

on

non-

minority firefighters.
This
1656.
and

case

involves

a

question not presented

in 84-

The suit was instituted by an association of black
Hispanic

Thirteenth

firefighters

and

discrimination
Local

Fourteenth
in

party

to

Local
the

Title

VII

Amendments,

promotions
This

AFL-CIO.

original

under

by

the

Union

suit.

claiming

City's
(No.

It

was

City

and

Cleveland)
affirmative
court.

the
gross

Firefighters

93)

was

not

permitted

intervene, as a party of right, by the DC.
negotiations,

and

minority

agreed

to

action

a

association
"consent

promotion

plan

(The

Vanguards

decree"
was

to

After extended

encouraged by a Magistrate and the DC,

the

an

in

which

approved

by

the
of
the
the

Local 93, then an intervenor, did not agree to the

consent decree, and formally objected to it.

This consent

decree

was

trial.

decree

contained

issued

discrimination
Fire.

by

as
a

a

settlement prior

number
the

City

of

recitals as
of

to

The

to history of

Cleveland's

Division

of

The DC's order found that the plaintiffs had stated

claims

under

Amendments.
black

and

Title
The

VII,

DC

hispanic

also

the

Thirteenth

certified

firefighters

a

and

Fourteenth

class

consisting

presently

employed

and

"who in the future will be employed as firefighters".

The

plan specifically provided for a list of promotions to be
made

no

later

than

February

10,

1983

over a hundred of specific promotions.
have

not

order,

examined

the

plan closely

that

totaled

well

As noted above, I

enough,

or

the

DC' s

to be sure of the extent of which the affirmative

action required would discriminate against white firemen though

it

is

jurisdiction

apparent
"with

that

regard

to

it

would.

any

The

DC

retained

court challenges

which

may be presented to any of the promotional examinations or
eligible lists provided for herein".
The

first

question presented

is whether

the DC had

authority to approve what is called a "consent plan" over
the objective of a union and its members in the absence of
the

issues having being resolved

in a trial.

Although I

hope it will not be necessary for us to decide the case on
this issue, I am inclined to think the DC erred.
The
principle

question

of

greater

interest

is

similar

in

to the affirmative action question in 84-1656.

There is this difference:

in 84-1656 (referred to as the

New York case)
Here,

the plan was adopted by a private union.

the employer is the City of Cleveland, and the City

approved the plan.

Thus, Webber is more pertinent in the

New York case, whereas Stotts is closer to this case.

The

specific question presented here was left open in Stotts.
In my

memo in the New York case,

I

relied on the amicus

brief filed by Bredhoff and Kaiser on behalf of the AFLCIO local unions
amicus
cases

brief
as

involved

views

the

involving

in both of

these cases.

affirmative action plans

quota

systems

that

their

in

the

for white

firefighters

solely

race.

The purpose

was

jobs and promotions available

to minorities

to make

because of

in both

results

deprivation of jobs or deferral of promotions,

This

who have not themselves been victims of the discrimination
concededly practiced by defendants in both of these cases.
The amicus brief mentioned,
the New York case,
under

§706(g)

as noted

in my memo

in

argues that quota systems are invalid

of Title VII,

as well as under §§1981 and

1983.
Again,

as

is

must

be

a

there
strong
quota

arguments
systems.

the

situation

half

dozen

being
As

I

or

presented

have

in

the

more

amici

both

indicated

New York

pro

case,

briefs
and

in Wygant,

with

con
I

for

think

there

is

a

significant

goals, and accordingly -

difference

between

quotas

and

subject to further consideration

and the views of my clerk -

I

am inclined to reverse in

this case.
LFP, JR.

84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

ArguJ d 2/25/86
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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

February 26, 1986

Bob

No.84-1999

LOCAL 93 v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

\

/vyv
I

think

this

case

is closer

than Local 28 because of

the

--------~'------~'---

difficulty of measuring the

impact of the promotion plan here.

Denying a promotion is halfway between a layoff and a refusal to
hire.

Below is an argument for

affirmance,

to which I

adhere,

stressing the closeness of the case.

My framework of analysis for this case is identical to that
in Local 28 in that I

------------

conclude that Title VII does not preclude

make-whole remedies that are not victim specific.

·· ...

'

paye

L..

I

Further,
consent

the

union here has

is essential

no basis to complain that its
''I
'I

to the approval of a consent decree.

The

petitioner union is required neither to do anything nor to forbear from any action as a result of the decree.

T~~ ights

to the proceeding below are protected in that

as a

t~ ~~~

to complain if the decree violates the substantive rights
-

of any of its members. For purposes of this case, those substan-

--------·-----------

tive rights will have been violated only if the decree in question

runs

Clause.

afoul

of

the

constraints

of

the

Equal

Protection

Here there was an admission of a history of discrimina-

tory practices on the part of the city, of which the DC made note
in approving

the

consent

decree.

Thus,

the state's compelling

interest in remedying past discrimination
mains for

is great,

and

--

it re-

the state to show that the means selected is narrowly

-------------

tailored to the achievement of the compelling state purpose.
Application of

the Fullilove

factors

here provide a

guide

for determining whether the remedy is so narrowly tailored.
First, relative to available alternatives, it is not entirely clear

to me that there might not have been some alternative

methods, such as

training courses with which to remedy the dis-

crimination here.

On this

record,

however,

it

is difficult to

~

assess the efficacy of those alternatives. The percentage relief
permitted

here,

because

it

allows

promotion

~

individuals is a valid alternative.

..........

~..--.._._

__

only

of
qualified
._............._...

Second, with respect to du-

ration, this remedy will cease to be employed once the goals are
met.

Third,

with

respect

to the percentages chosen,

fair although it may be difficult to estimate.

they seem

The minority pop-

I

ulation of the City of Cleveland is over 47%, , and the decree es_.......

.il

tablishes goals that go no higher than 25% for the ran~ 1 of lieutenant.

-

Finally, with respect to flexibility, there would appear

little room for the city to deviate from the agreed upon percentages.

On the other

hand,

that

is

arguably less

important in a

case in which an employer has consented to a particular rate of
promotion.

In addition,

the DC does
-~-

----- - ·-

retain power to amend the
~-

--~

-

decree, and the decree requires the promotion of no minority that

- --·- --

is not qualified.

- ------

These would appear to address the concerns of

flexibility.

~

~ This leaves the question of the effect on nonminori ties.

~tr' s

apparently conceded

at oral ar:;::nt

that

the City in-

creased significantly the number of promotions it was willing to
make,

thus

promotibn

reducing

dramatically

expectations.

On

the

the

impact

on

nonminor i _ties'

other

hand,

it

was

also made

plain that although all promoted would be qualified, some minorities with lower scores would be promoted ahead of nonminorities
with higher scores.

If the logic of Wygant is that as long as

some victims can be identified, then the plan is not

~

sufficiently ~

narrowly tailored, then arguably
those who score better than pro- ~._.
moted nonminorities
this plan.

are

On the other

_

~~

__,

identifiable and suffer
hand,

if

as

a

result of

the purpose of Wygant

is to

focus on the gravity of harm to individuals, such as comparing a
layoff goal to a hiring goal, then the harm in being passed over
here is less great.
the broadening of

I am inclined to a view, very slightly, that

~~

the promotion pool here sufficiently tempered

----------------------

the burden of the plan so as to make it a narrowly tailored plan.

,. '

'

I would affirm the decision below.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 28, 1986

No. 84-1999

Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I passed at Conference to consider further the
questions raised in this case.
I am inclined to think the
sole
e tion that need be decided is whether a consent
deere
court order for purposes of §706(g). If not,
then ev~ if the last sentence of §706(g) places limitations
on a federal court's power to awar:d :race-conscious -rel-ief -to persons who have not been shown to be the victims of
violations of Title VII, those limitations have no
application in this case. It seems to me that the
legislative history that has been cited to us suggests that
Congre$s was concerned, both in 1964 and in 1972, with the
possibility that courts might order employers or unions to
remedy \proven violations of Title VII by adopting quotas,
and with the possibility that Title VII might be interpreted
as mandating quotas even in the absence of proven
violations. The first concern may well have resulted in
limitations on race-conscious relief embodied in the last
sentence of §706(g), see Firefighters Local No. 1784 v.
Stotts, --u.s.--, -- (1984), and the second is expressed
1n the provisions of §703(j). See United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 u.s. 193, 205, n. 5 (1979). But ne1ther of these
concerns is present where a voluntary settlement between
plaintiff and defendant prov1oes ~ for these forms of relief,
because in that situation, by definition, it is the
agreement of the parties rather than the force of federal
· w that creates the obligation to furnish race-conscious
relief. Even where a voluntary settlement is submitted to a
federal court in the form of a consent decree, that remains
true. The obligation is creat d BY~he agreement of the
parties. Whiletne federal 'court may- r~taib ju\risdiction to
enforce the decree, I see no indication in the legislative
history that the availability of federal enforcement of an
obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation
It

\\

-

--.,_

~

.

.

itself, was the focus of congressional concern. ~his
difference, together with the strong congressional
preference that Title VII be construed to encourage
voluntary compliance, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 u.s. 36, 44 (1974); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1983), persuades me that Congress did
not intend to bar a federal court from approving a consent
decree simply because the court might not be able to order
the same relief after trial.
Of course, if the relief provided for in a consent
decree and agreed to by a public employer violates the
F9f rteenth Amendment, the decree is unlawful and must be set
aside. In this case, I am inclined to think it is
unnecessary and inadvisable to reach this question. It is
true that the Court of Appeals said that petitioner had
standing to challenge the consent decree "on the grounds
that it unlawfully infringes upon the constitutional rights
of the non-minority firefighters," Pet. App. A-9, and that
the court suggested that the Weber analysis would govern its
analysis of any Fourteenth Amendment cl im. The ~et ~ ion
for certiorari presented two que ~tlon · l ~hether a-a istrict
cou r t can adopt a consent decree providing relief that the
court cou ~~ ot order as a remedy after trial on a Title VII
claim, a dkwbether a municipal employer can voluntarily
adopt an affirmative action plan that awards relief to
minority employees regardless of whether they were actual
victims of past discrimination over the objections of an
intervenor union.
Neither question was phrased in
constitutional terms, and judging from the body of the
petition it does not appear that even the second question is
a constitutional one. See Pet. for Cert. 7-8. Moreover,
the Solicitor General did not suggest review of the
constitutional question or brief it, and petitioner's brief
includes but one passage suggesting a constitutional claim-and that appears to be a due process claim, not one based on
the Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for Petitioner 3031. At oral argument, both petitioner and the Assistant
Attorney General suggested that this was a statutory case,
not a constitutional one. Under these circums ances, r
think there is little basis for reaching the constitutional
question, though I recognize that we have power to do so.

r

I

There are also good reasons to refrain from
addressing that question, given the posture of this case.
JUSTICE POWELL's circulating draft in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, No. 84-1340, would seem to indicate that
a careful assessment of whether the remedy is narrowly
tailored and will not inflict disproportionate harm on the
interests of innocent non-victims, or unnecessarily trammel
their rights, is essential to resolving the

3.

ll

constitutionality of the affirmative act ion plan 'J See
circulating draft, at 9-12. The constitutionality of the
affirmative action plan, in my view, may therefore turn on
the extent of the harm imposed on innocent non-victims, and
on the extent to which the beneficiaries of the relief were
actual or likely victims of past discrimination. The City
suggests that by creating additional promotions it avoided
harm to the white firefighters, but on the record before us
that is not a question that can be resolved with any
confidence. Nor do we know how the second and third phases
of the affirmative action plan will affect the promotions
available to white firefighters.
In this posture, I think we would do well to merely
decide the statutory issue and leave open on remand the
( constitutional question to be considered after development
of the facts.
Sincerely,

\
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CLEVE SALLY-POW

84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland
Dear Chief:
My vote in this case is to reverse on the basis
of the same analysis outlined in my letter of this date
adivising that I would affirm 84-1656 Local 28 v. EEOC.
These two cases are similar in many respects, but
there are controlling differences.

It is not contested

that minorities had been discriminated against in
promotions among Cleveland's firefighters.

As was true in

the New York case, the governmental interest was
compelling in remedying the past discrimination.

The

question remains whether the city has shown that the means
it selected is narrowly tailored to the achieving of its

,'

2.

compelling purpose.

In my view, no such showing has been

made.
Inflexible quotas were established for the
promotion of blacks.

It is true that to ameliorate the

adverse effect of these quotas, the city increased the
number of officers it would accommodate among the
firefighters.

In addition, it was contemplated that all

applicants for promotion would have to take a test, and so
long as minimum scores were made on these tests black
applicants could be preferred over whites who had scored
higher.

The inevitable effect, it seems to me, is that in

order to achieve the specified number of black officers in
the various categories, better qualified white applicants
would be denied promotion.

3.

In the New York case, it was conceded that no
white had been or would be laid off by the DC's order.
For me, this is a critically distinguishing fact.

Nor was

any suggestion made in the New York case that a less
restrictive remedy of the past discrimination was
available.

In this case, identical goals could have been

established for promotions to each category of rank, and
the selections for promotion could have been made on the
basis of considering all relevant factors.

These would

include not only race and test scores, but experience by
the applicant within the firefighters, some demonstration
of ability to lead that should be required in officers,
and likelihood that the candidate for promotion would have
the respect of fellow white and minority firefighters.

In

a word, rather than having arbitrary and inflexible quotas

4.

for each officer rank to be attained by specified dates
(Bob and Mike, is this correct?), other fairer and more
reasonable means to achieve the goal could have been
adopted.

The DC also could have retained jurisdiction -

as 1 believe it did - to assure that fairness in promotion
was scrupulously followed in which race was one factor
that should be considered but would not necessarily be
controlling.

(Mike and Bob:

At Conference Justice White

relied strongly on his opinion in Stotts as particularly
relevant to the Cleveland case.
to agree with him.

Justice O'Connor seemed

I have not reread Stotts.

If there is

merit to Justice White's view- and he was persuasiveplease draft a paragraph on the relevance of Stotts in

5.

Cleveland, and explaining why it would be less relevant in
New York.)
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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CLEVE SALLY-POW

84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland
Dear Chief:
My vote in this case is to reverse on the basis
of the same analysis outlined in my letter of this date
adivising that 1 would affirm 84-1656 Local 28 v. EEOC.
These two cases are similar in many respects, but
there are controlling differences.

It is not contested

that minorities had been discriminated against in
promotions among Cleveland's firefighters.

As was true in

the New York case, the governmental interest was
compelling in remedying the past discrimination.

The

question remains whether the city has shown that the means
it selected is narrowly tailored to the achieving of its

2.

compelling purpose.

In my view, no such showing has been

made.
Inflexible quotas were established for the
promotion of blacks.

It is true that to ameliorate the

adverse effect of these quotas, the city increased the
number of officers it would accommodate among the
firefighters.

In addition, it was contemplated that all

applicants for promotion would have to take a test, and so
long as minimum scores were made on these tests black
applicants could be preferred over whites who had scored
higher.

The inevitable effect, it seems to me, is that in

order to achieve the specified number of black officers in

the various

categories.~tt:; quali~hite

would be denied promotion.

applicants

3.

In the New York case, it was conceded that no
white had been or would be laid off by the DC's order.
For me, this is a critically distinguishing fact.

Nor was

any suggestion made in the New York case that a less
restrictive remedy of the past discrimination was
available.

In this case,

identical goals could have been

established for promotions to each category of rank, and
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the selections for promotion could have been made on the
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basis of considering all relevant factors.
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These would
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include not only race and test scores, but experience by
the applicant within the firefighters, some demonstration
of ability to lead that should be required in officers,
and likelihood that the candidate for promotion would have
the respect of fellow white and minority firefighters.

In

a word, rather than having arbitrary and inflexible quotas
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for each officer rank ...t-e be ateeified by specifieEI date~
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(Bob and Mike, is this correct?), other fairer and more
reasonable means
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adopted.

goal could have been

"'

The DC also could have retained jurisdiction -

as 1 believe it did - to assure that fairness in promotion
was scrupulously followed in which race

was~e fact~

that should be considered but would not necessarily be
controlling.

(Mike and Bob:
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At Conference Justice White

relied strongly on his opinion in Stotts as particularly
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relevant to the Cleveland case.
to agree with him.

Justice O'Connor seemed

1 have not reread Stotts.

1f there is ()

merit to Justice White's view - and he was persuasive please draft a paragraph on the relevance of Stotts in

s.

Cleveland, and explaining why it would be less relevant in
New York.)
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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Rider A, p.

(Affirmative Action)

R!DB SALLY-POW

Local 93 (Cleveland)
On the record before us, the court's order
approving the consent decree fairly can be viewed as an
impermissible quota under §706(g).

It requires the

employer to promote a fixed percentage of minorities, and
its adverse effect on innocent non-minority employees
could be substantial.

In order to achieve the specified

number of minority officers in various categories nonminority employees almost certainly will be disadvantaged
solely because of race.

I would be inclined, therefore,

to hold that the DC's order - if it be viewed as such - is

,'.,'"

\

'1'

invalid under both §706(g) and the Equal Protection
Clause.
Sandra made a point, however, that had not
occurred to me prior to our Conference.

Her tentative

position, as 1 understand it, is that there is a different
between a consent decree and the imposition of a goal or
quota by a court in the absence of such consent.

1 could

agree with this view as a sensible way to dispose of the
Cleveland case, particularly since the record leaves much
to be desired.

We did not grant cert on the

constitutional question, and this is an additional reason
for agreeing with the distinction that Sandra suggests
between a consent decree and a remedy ordered by a
District Court over the objection of the parties.

If, however, we reach the substantive issues, 1
would be inclined to hold that the remedial action ordered
in Local 93 is an impermissible quota both under §706{g)
and the Equal Protection Clause.
latter .

.•

1 comment briefly on the

{Here, Mike, summarize my views).

J
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Rider A {Affirmative Action Cases)

RIDAF SALLY-POW
The distinction between a goal and a quota often
is quite fact-specific.

Expressed generally, a valid goal

(see, e.g., my draft opinion in Wygant) would not require
an employer to hire or promote a specified number of
minority employees by a certain date without regard to the
effect upon innocent non-minority employees.

A quota

would have these characteristics, including the burdening
of rights of non-minorities.

1 do not think that goals

would be ineffective, certainly where one is approved by a
court.

Where past discrimination has been found, a court

will prohibit the engaging of such discrimination in the
future, and will retain jurisdiction to assure compliance.
In addition, a goal- e.g., say a 30% minority work force

..

- could be set with a tentative target date for achieving
it.

The principal difference between the quota and the

goal is that the latter would provide flexibility,
including specifically the right of the employer to
consider relevant factors pertinent to the qualifications
of the applicant in addition to race, and would protect
innocent employees from discharge or denial of equal
opportunities for promotion.

As the brief of the NMA

notes, goals are generally approved by businesses and have
proved efficacious in most cases.

For the most part, the

goals have been voluntarily adopted with the view to
achieving a work force generally in accord with the number
of reasonably qualified minorities in the available work
force market.

Under a goal there may be some adverse

impact upon non-minorities who seek employment or

promotion but this effect is diffused - again as I have
stated in Wygant.
Applying the foregoing to Local 28 (New York)

is

not easy in view of the problem that confronted the DC in
that case.

On its face, the DC's order would appear to be

an impermissible quota as Judge Pierce, dissenting, was
inclined to think.

But one would hope that the situation

that confronted the District Court was unique.

The nature

and degree of the discrimination by Local 28 was shocking.
Moreover, the contemptuous conduct of that union in
violating orders of the DC finally required that court to
conclude that the 29% objective must be attained by a
specific date.

Yet, as counsel for the union stated at

argument, there is no evidence that any non-minority
member of the union had been laid off or adversely

affected.

Nor is there anything in the record before us

to show that in achieving the 29% target, non-minorities
will be penalized in the future.
assume that they will.

I do not think we can

The DC already has been generous

in granting extensions of time, and it has retained
jurisdiction.
In light of the foregoing views, and recognizing
that the issue is a close one, my vote in Local 28 is to
affirm.

I will not be inclined to join an opinion that

does not make clear the difference between goals and
quotas - a difference both under Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause.

I add ere that I would find no

violation of equal protection under the special
circumstances of the New York case.
A

A

A

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

March 5,

1~86

,.,'

From: Bob

'I

No. 84-1999 Local 93

1. We did not discuss this case yesterday afternoon.

In order to

track more closely the letter of Justice O'Connor, I suggest one
change.

The last sentence of your note currently states:

"I therefore agree with Sandra that it would be helpful to remand
with directions to the DC to hold an evidentiary hearing as to
the effect of the affirmative action plan on innocent nonminority employees."

I think the following language more

closely tracks Justice O'Connor, and places the onus on the
petitioners to object on constitutional grounds on remand:
therefore agree with Sandra that this is an issue that should
left open for consideration on remand."
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.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

March 6, 1986

84-1656 Local 28 v. EEOC

Dear Chief:
Although I find this a close and difficult case,
my tentative vote is to affirm. This vote is predicated
primarily on the undisputed record of gross discrimination
by the union over a period of at least two decades, and its
intransigence in resisting every effort (including court
orders) to implement appropriate remedies. (See the attached
appendix).
In addition, the District Court has been remarkably flexible over the years, and, importantly for me, unlike Wygant, there is nothing before us to suggest that individual union members will have to be laid off.
In sum, it seems to me that under the circumstances of this case, the courts had little option--in the
exercise of their duty to end discrimination--other than to
take the remedial action before us.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

APPENDIX (84-1656)

In its . l975 opinion, the District Court remarked:
The record in both state and federal courts
against these [union and JAC] defendants is
replete with instances of their bad faith
attempts to prevent or delay affirmative action. After [state] Justice Markowitz [in
his 1964 state court proceeding] ordered implementation of the Corrected Fifth Draft,
with the intent and hope that it would create
a •truly nondiscriminatory union[,]• Local 28
flouted the court's mandate by expending
union funds to subsidize special training
sessions designed to give union members'
friends and relatives a competitive edge in
taking the JAC battery. JAC obtained an exemption from state affirmative action regulations directed towards the administration of
apprentice programs on the ground that its
program was operating pursuant to court
order; yet Justice Markowitz had specifically
provided that all such subsequent regulations, to the extent not inconsistent with
his order, were to be incorporated therein
and applied to JAC's program. More recently,
the defendants unilaterally suspended courtordered time tables for admission of forty
non-whites to the apprentice program pending
trial of this action, only completing the
admission process under threat of contempt
citations.

....

In light of Local 28's and JAC's failure to
•clean house• this court c.oncludes that the
imposition of a remedial racial goal ••• is
essential to place the defendants in a position of compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. (A-352)
CA2 in its 1976 opinion, stated that the record demonstrated •a long and persistent pattern of discrimination,•
and that the 29% requirement could be permissible when deal-

2.
il

ing with "recalcitrant unions which have defied gflntler
means of enforcement •••• " (A-215 to 216, 222).
Finally, the CA2 in its 1985 opinion declared: "This
court has twice recognized Local 28's long continued and
egregious racial discrimination ••• and Local 28 has presented no facts to indicate that our earlier observations
are no longer apposite."(A-32, citations omitted).
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March 6, 1986

84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

Dear Chief:

At least for now, my vote is to ag re~ with Sandra's
position. There i.s a difference bet wee~ the approval by a
court of an agreement between the parties, and an order of a
court that is contested by the employer.
Although I thin~ it likely, under the consent decree, that non-minority members of the unlon t.zill be discriminated against in promotions, the record does not make
this clear. Nor is any member of the union making a claim.
I therefore agree with Sandra that this Js an issue that
should be left open for consideration on remand.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 10, 1986
RE:

No. 84-1999 - Local 93 v. Cleveland

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I "passed" at Conference on this case.
reverse.

Regards,

. t

I now vote to

To: The Chiet J ust1ce
Justice White
Justice Marshall ...;' "?
Justice Blackmun ~
Justice Powell
Justice Rfhnquis>-,..,"'~ ~
Justice Stevens ·so·--t
.Justice O'Connor ~ .
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May -

, 1986]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent de- :r-....u- ~
cree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who
were not the actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory cL+-ql~-~
practices.
I
b~k
On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (the Van;;de~
~ guards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters ~wiL-l
.
,
/
employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging
~~
the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred
/
/
to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of
~~7/LI
~
race and national origin "in the hiring, assignment and proD- - motion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire DeW~ ~
partment." App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a
I'
~ ~ -e.+ class of blacks and Hisp:,1nics consisting of firefighters already
~
employed by the City, applicants for employment, and "all
- I 'f
blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employ2 , ~ G ~s ~
ment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire
~k ~
?
Department." Id., at 8.
~ - "). 2.
The Vanguards claimed that the City had violated the
, S ~ _ -;... z....
rights of the plaintiff class under the Thirteenth and
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Fourteeth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.§§ 2000e
et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although the complaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and
work assignments, the ~ chargeq that
black and Hispanic firefighters "have ... been discriminated
against b
their race a
national ori 'n in the
awarding
romotion
'thin the Fire Department." Id.,
at 11. 1 The comp aint averred that this discrimination was
effectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City.
The written examination used for making promotions was alleged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said
to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the
manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not
be near the top of promotion lists when positions became
available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority
advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new
promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the
effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from
certain litigation commenced in 1973.
As just noted, the Vanguards' lawsuit was not the first in
which the City had to defend itself against c4arges of race
discrimination in hiring and promotion in its civil services.
In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an action
' The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the
lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion
Chief, Assistant Chief and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter
must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written examination. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80%
of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a
place on a promotion eligibility list. Although rankings on the lists are
based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis
of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to
remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year,
and , as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full two year
period. Promotions are mad.e from the lists as positions become available.
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alleging that the Police Department discriminated against
minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City
of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District
Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining
certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing minority hiring goals. In 1.[L7, these hiring goals were adjusted and promotion goals- were established ursuant to a
consent decree. Therea ter, 1tlga 1on raising similar claims
was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in
a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a
consent decree imposing hiring quotas similar to those ordered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio 1973). In 1977, after additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new plan
governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department.
By the time the Vanguards filed their complaint, then, the
City had already unsuccessfully contested many of the basic
factual issues in other lawsuits. Naturally, this influenced
the City's view of the Vanguards' case. As expressed by
counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court:
"[W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleveland had e~ears at that point of litigating these
types of cases, an eight years of having judges rule
agamst the City of Clevelana.
·
rry ou don't have to beat us on the head. We finally
learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do
to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city
to comply with the law fully .... " Tr. of Oral Arg.
41-42.
Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litigation, the City entered into "serious settlement negotiations"
with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980,
from Edward R. Stege and Mark I. Wallach to Hon. Thomas
J. Lambros.
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. (Local 93 or
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the Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland's
firefighters, moved pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2)
to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District Court granted
the motion and ordered the Union to submit its complaint in
intervention within 30 days.
Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document
entitled "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." Despite
its title, this document did not allege any causes of action or
assert any claims against either the Vanguards or the City.
It expressed the view that "[p]romotions based upon any criterion other than competence, such as a racial quota system,
would deny those most capable from their promotions and
would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from maintaining the best possible fire fighting force," and asserted
that "Local #93's interest is to maintain a well trained and
properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends
that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated
competency, properly measured by competitive examinations
administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of
Federal, State, and Local laws." I d., at 27, 28. The "complaint" concluded with a prayer for relief in the form of an injunction requiring the City to award promotions on the basis
of such examinations. I d., at 28.
In the meantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and
the City continued, and a proposed consent decree was submitted to the District Court in November, 1981. This proposal established "interim procedures" to be implemented "as
a two-step temporary remedy" for past discrimination in promotions. I d., at 33. The first step required that a fixed
number of already planned promotions be reserved for minorities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant,
3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promotions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to Assistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. I d.,
at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of
"appropriate minority promotion goal[s]," id., at 34, for the
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ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The proposal also required the City to forego using seniority points
as a factor in making promotions. I d., at 32-33. The plan
was to remain in effect for 9 years, ami could be extended
upon mutual application of the parties for an additional6-year
period. I d., at 36.
The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of
January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent
decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional
goals and to the 9-year life of the decree. In addition, the
Union protested the fact that it had not been included in the
negotiations. This latter objection particularly troubled the
District Judge. Indeed, although hearing evidence presented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the
decree, the Judge stated that he was "appalled that these negotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the
intervenors . . . , " and refused to pass on the decree under
the circumstances. Tr. of January 7, 1982, Proceedings
Before the Hon. Thomas J. Lambros 134. Instead, he concluded, "I am going at this time to defer this proceeding until
another day and I am mandating the City and the [Vanguards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in
dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their particular problems." I d., at 151. At the same time, Judge
Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its
objections more specific to accomplish anything: "I don't
think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their position on the basis that, 'Well, Judge, you know, there's something inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not
fair.' We need more than that." Id., at 153.
A second hearing was held on April 27. Local 93 continued to oppose any form of affirmative action. Witnesses
____.for ,.
all parties testified concerning the · ro ~e.
Thetest1mony revea ed that, while the consent decree dealt
only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned
by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to

..
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make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to
hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battalion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros
proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high number of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The
Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants
rather than 40, it could "plug in a substantial number of black
leadership that can start having some influence in the operation of this fire department" while still promoting the same
non-minority officers who would have obtained promotions
under the existing system. Tr. of April 27, 1982, Proceedings Before Hon. Thomas D. Lambros 147-148. Additional
testimony revealed that this approach had led to the amicable
resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Georgia. Judge
Lambros persuaded the parties to consider revamping the
consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta plan. The proceedings were therefore adjourned and the matter was referred to a United States Magistrate.
Cou!!§_e~arties particip~ in forty hours of
intensive ne otiations unc1e:itfie Magistrate~~ion
an agreed to a ev1sed consent ae~Ii"a"tincorporated a
modifiedvers1on ~~. See App. 79 (Report of
Magistrate). However, submission of this proposal to the
court was made contingent upon approval by the membership
of Local 93. Despite the fact that the revised consent decree
actually increased the number of supervisory positions available to non-minorit firefighters , the Union members overwhelmingly ejected he proposal. 2
~
2

The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magistrate's Report to the District Court:
"Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a
touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable recommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union's Executive Board would be given serious consideration by the general membership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit,
pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations, have again strained relations between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feel-
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On January 11, 1983, the Vanguards and the City lodged a
second amended consent decree with the court and moved for
its approval.
is proposal was "patterned very closely
upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of
[the] Magistrate ... ," App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus
its central feature was the creation of many more promotional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically,
the decree required that the City immediately make 66 promotions to Lieutenant, 32 promotions to Captain, 16 promotions to Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief.
These promotions were to be based on a promotional examination that had been administered during the litigation. The
66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split between minority and non-minority firefighters. However,
since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level
positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be
promoted. The decree further required promotional examinations to be administered in June of 1984 and December of
1985. Promotions from the lists produced by these examinations were to be made in accordance with specified promotional "goals" that were expressed in terms of percentages
and were different for each rank. The list from the 1985
examination would remain in effect for 2 years, after which
time the decree would expire. The life of the decree was
thus shortened from 9 years to 4. In addition, except where
necessary to implement specific requirements of the consent
decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a factor in
ranking candidates for promotion. App. to Pet. for Cert.
A29-A38.
ings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped
that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is
not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such
reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together,
without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals
rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engaging in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for
optimism at this time." App. 78.
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Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph
16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning
compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. !d., at
A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdiction with respect to applications or claims made by "any
party, including Intervenor." !d., at A38. The decree imposed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93.
On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the members of the plaintiff class o t e erms o t e ~ecree.
In~o wis ed to object to the proposal
were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93
filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent
decree:
"Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly maintained that there must be a more equitable, more fair,
more just way to correct the problems caused by the
[City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be
unnecessary 'remedial' methods embodied in the law
have been explored and some have been utilized.
"Local #93 reiterates it's [sic] absolute and total objection to the use of racial quotas which must by their very
nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire Service. Since this problem is obviously the concern of the
collective representatives of all members of the fire service, Intervenors, Local #93. [sic] We respectfully urge
this court not to implement the 'remedial' provisions of
this Decree." Objections to Consent Decree 3.
Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and
necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still
failed to assert any legal claims against either the Vanguards
or~~
- ~----~~--------------------------

L---

1
'

In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced
objections to the~osed consentdecreeGlPersonalletters fo the District
Courr.-1'h eoasis of their objections was the same as the Union's. App.
to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (Memorandum Opinion and
Order of District Court).

?

?
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The District Court approved the consent decree on January 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that "[t]he documents,
statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April
1982 hearings reveal a historical Qattern o~cial .!!!.scrimina
tiQn ~n the promotional practices of the City of Cleveland Fire
Department." App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3-A4. He then observed:
"While the concerns articulated by Local 93 may be
valid, the use of a(.g§!a systiiiJ for the relatively short
period of four years 1s not unreasonable in light of the
demonstrated history of racial discrimination in promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is
neither unreasonable nor unfair to re~ire non-min'orlfy
firefig ter_Lw o, alt ough t_!Iez__co~Q. wrong,
benfitted from the ef!ects of the discri~n to bear
some ofthehurdenofthe'-rem~y. ~urthermore, the
amended p~re reasonable and less burdensome than the nine-year plan that had been proposed
originally." I d., at A5.
The Judge therefore overruled the Union's objection and
adopted the consent decree "as a fair, reasonable, and adequate~aims raised in this action." Ibid.
The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for "all purposes of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th[e]
Decree upon application of any party . . .. " App. to Pet. for
Cert. 38.
The Union ap eale the overruling of its objections. A
panel for e ourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
one judge dissenting. 753 F . 2d 479 (1985). The court rejected the Union's claim that the use of race-conscious relief
was "unreasonable," finding such relief justified by the statistical evidence presented to the District Court and the City's
express admission that it had engaged in discrimination.
The court also found that the consent decree was "fair and
reasonable to non-minority firefighters," emphasizing the
"relatively modest goal~ set forth in the plan," the fact that

.'
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"the plan does not require the hiring of unqualified minority
firefighters or the discharge of any non-minority
firefighters," the fact that plan "does not create an absolute
bar to the advancement of non-minority employees," and the
short duration of the plan. I d., at 485.
After oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this
Court decided Firefighters Local Union No . 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U. S. 561 (1984). "Concerned with the potential impact
of Stotts," the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submit
supplemental briefs, 753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately
concluded that Stotts did not affect the outcome of the case.
The court noted that the District Court in Stotts had issued
an injunction requiring layoffs over the objection of the City,
while in this case the City of Cleveland had agreed to the
plan. The court reasoned that even if Stotts holds that Title
VII limits relief to those who have been actual victims of discrimination, "[t]he fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an injunction makes the legal basis of the Stotts
decision inapplicable." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 4
Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The
so~b~ petitjon is wh~er the consent decree is an impermissible remedy under § 706(g) of Title VII. 5

----

'The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the
injunction imposed by the District Court in that case "had the direct effect
of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority
workers," while "[i]n this case, the consent decree assured the integrity of
the existing seniority system." 753 F. 2d, at 486.
5
The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions:
"1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting
to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order
as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial?
"2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action
promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected
to represent all employees when said ro tio I
erne adverse! affects
the rights and in~m_£loye_es and awards relief to..Jllinority employees regardless of whether £lleywere actual victims of past racial discrimmation ?" Pet.r~,

84-1999-0PINION
FIREFIGHTERS v. CLEVELAND

Local 93 argues that the consent decree disregards the express-p;-ohibition of the last sentence of § 706(g) that -

- --·

--

---

--...._

-.....__

-

"[n]o order of the court shall require the admission or
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or
the hiring, reinstatement, or Eromotion of an individual
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual was refused admission, sus ended or
expelleQ,Or_was re]useaemJ!lo~or advancertJ&11.,t or
was sus~ed or discharged for any_ reason other than
discriminatwnon ~nt 0 race color,-l:!iligion, sex,
or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of
this title." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added).
~~

According to Local 93, this sentence precludes a court from
awarding relief under Title VII that may benefit individuals
who were not the actual victims of the employer's discrimination. The Union argues further that the plain language of
the provision that "[n]o order of the court" shall provide such
relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in
addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the
Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII
litigation is invalid if-like the consent decree approved in
this case-it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit individuals who are not themselves actual victims of an employThe first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes
the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can conceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect
of the consent decree on petitioner's legal rights, neither the petition for
certiorari nor the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than
whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII.
Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent decree was "reasonable," and then, after Stotts was decided, to whether the
consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District
Court's retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press whatever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at - - .
Therefore, we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether
§ 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree .

.

....

(
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er's discrimination. The Union is supported by the United
States as amicus curiae. 6
We granted the petition in order to answer this important
question of federal law. - - U. S. - - (1985). We hold
today in Local28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ante, at
- - , that courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief
under Title VII that benefits individuals who were not the actual victims of a defendant's discriminatory practices. We
need not decide whether this is one of those cases, however.
For we hold that whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court
from imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after
trial, that provision does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. 7 We therefore affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
II
We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress
intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means
of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CA8
1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers "to
self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history"). See also, International B'hd of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v.
The United States took exactly the opposite position in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for the
United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 0. T. 1978, Nos. 432, 435, and
436, pp. 26-38.
'We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is
intended to express a view as to the extent of a court's remedial power
under§ 706(g) in cases where that provision does apply. That question is
addressed in Local28 v. EEOC, ante, a t - .
6
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EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228 (1982); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 461 U. S. 757,
770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promulgated guidelines setting forth its understanding that "Congress strongly encouraged employers . . . to act on a
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems
which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity
.... " 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC:
"The principle of nondiscrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and
the principle that each person subject to Title VII should
take voluntary action to correct the effects of past discrimination and to prevent present and future discrimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually
consistent and interdependent methods of addressing social and economic conditions which precipitated the enactment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be
encouraged in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII." !d. § 1608.1(c) (footnote
omitted).
It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to employers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination.
This was the holding of United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). In Weber, an employer and a
union agreed in collective bargaining to reserve for black employees 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant
was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local
labor force. After considering both the purposes of Title
VII and its legislative history, we concluded that "it would be
ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over

' 1''$ •
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centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had 'been excluded from the American dream for
so long' constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." I d., at 204 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we held that Title VII permits
employers and unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable
race-conscious affirmative action, although we left to another
day the task of "defin(ing] in detail the line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans." I d., at 208.
Of course, Weber involved a purcl,~ate contractual
agreement rather than a consent decree. But, at least at
first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distinguish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and
voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litigation. Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands , Inc., 450
U. S. '79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court's
order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under
28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines
Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims" under Title
VII. Moreover, the EEOC's guidelines concerning "Mfirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," 29 CFR Part 1608, plainly contemplate the use
of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary affirmative action. See, e. g., id. § 1608.8. 8 True, these
guidelines do not have the force of law, General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they "constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id., at 142
The EEOC has not joined the Brief for the United States in this case.
The Solicitor General's brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney
General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII ,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the federal government in its capacity
as an employer, i d. § 2000e-16.
8

1
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(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no reason to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermissible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a consent decree.
Local 93 and the Solicitor General find a contrary indicator
in § 706(g), wh1ch governs e urts' remedial power under
Title VII. They, contend that § 706(g) establishes an independent limitation on w at u -as opposed to employers
or unions-can do, pro i 1tmg ny "order of the court" from
providing relierthat may benefit non-victims. They argue
that a consent decree should be treated as an "order" within
the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force
and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely
for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent decrees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as
a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objection of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift /1); third, that non-compliance
with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt
of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435,
440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.).
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement
of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420'0. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour &
Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we
have previously recognized, consent decrees "have attributes
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character
that has resulted in different treatment for different pur-
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poses. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether
we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judgboth. The question is whether, given
ment," for we can do ....___,.
their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns
embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating
them as "orders" within the meaning of that provision.
The co11clusion in Weber that "Congress chose not to forbid
all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action" when it enacted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative history, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned
to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discretion. Weber, supra, at 205-207. As originally enacted,
Title VII re lated only private enterprises; the liberal Repub 1cans and Sout ern emocrats whose support was crucial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings
about the potential for government intrusion into the managerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was
necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. I d., at 206.
Their votes were obtained only after they were given assurances a 'management perogat1ves, an umon eedoms
aret:Obe left und1stur6ed to the greatest extent possible."
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29
(1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (remarks of Rep.
Celler); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 14314
(remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep.
McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than
seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more conservative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of
power in 1964 "were far more concerned to avoid the intrusion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard
would entail." Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65
Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra,
at 206-207, n. 7 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (remarks of

•
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Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating about "preferential treatment or quotas in employment" because it believed that "the problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level
closer to the American people and by communities and individuals themselves").
The legislative history pertaining specifically to § 706(g)
suggests that it was drafted with this concern in mind and, in
fact, that Congress added the last sentence of§ 706(g) specifically to protect managerial perogatives of employers and unions.9 See Local28 v. EEOC, ante, a t - - - - - (discussing the legislative history). See also, H. R. Rep. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. ·12 (1963) (first version of § 706(g)
preserving employer defense of "cause"); 110 Cong. Rec.
2567-2571 (amending this version to substitute "for any reason other than discrimination" in place of "cause"); id., at
2567 (remarks of Rep. Celler, the amendment's sponsor, that
the amendment's purpose was "to specify cause"); id., at 6549
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey that § 706(g) makes clear "that
employers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote
for any reason, good or bad" except when such decisions
violate the substantive provisions of Title VII). Thus, even
if the last sentence of § 706(g) does limit the power of federal
courts to compel employers and unions to take certain actions
that the employers or unions oppose and would not otherwise
take, § 706(g) simply is not concerned with obligations that
'Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Although the legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the
same concern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental
employers that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector,
there is also no indication that Congress intended to leave governmental
employers with less latitude than had been left to employers in the private
sector when Title VII was originally enacted. See generally, Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972).
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are created by voluntary action of employers or unions. 10
From this, it is readily apparent that consent decrees are ~
no~he "o~s" referred to in §7G6Cg), for
the voluntary nature of a cOriSent decree is its most fundamental characteristic. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. 8., at 235-237; United States v. Armour & Co. , supra; Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353
(1952); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co. , 360 U. S. 19
(1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S. 900, 902 (1983)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As
we observed in United States v. Armour & Co.:
"Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation.
Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose;
rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to
each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much
of those opposing purposes as the respective parties
have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. " 402
U. 8., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
10
This is not to suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions is
outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on non-minorities.
We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trai l
Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976) , and Weber, supra. We hold only that
such concerns were not the source of§ 706(g), which focuses on preserving
certain management perogatives from interference by the federal courts.
The rights of non-minorities with respect to action by their employers are
delineated in§ 703 of Title Vll, 42 U. S. C.§ 2000e-2. See Weber , supra.
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Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source
of the court's authority to enter any judgment at all. See
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (cannot enter consent decree to which one party has not consented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
More
importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally
based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress
placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose obligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of Title
VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are created by a consent decree.
The features of consent decrees designated by the Union
and the Sqlicitor General do not require a contrary result.
The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered
after a trial obviously does not implicate Congress' concern
with limiting the power of federal courts unilaterally to require employers or unions to make certain kinds of employment decisions. The same is true of the court's conditional
power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an
unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a
consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations
were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court. 11 Finally, we reject the argument that a
consent decree should be treated as an "order" within the
meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation
for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative history that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the
focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement
is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a colHowever, as is discussed below, the court's exercise of the power to
modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate
§ 706(g). Infra, at - - - .- .
11

'

.
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lective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent
decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But
the difference between contractual remedies and the contempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with respect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement
scheme-whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have
an agreement entered as a consent decree-is itself made voluntarily by the parties. 12 Thus, it does not implicate Congress' concern that federal courts not impose unwanted obligations o e lo er and unions any more t an the decision
to institu
ace-conscious affirmative action in the first
place; in both cases the parties have t emse ves created obligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory compromise.
Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather
than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator
points out, "[p)ublic law settlements are often complicated documents designed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-ofcourt settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to
continuing oversight and interpretation by the court." Schwarzschild,
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887, 899 (footnote omitted). In additi,on to this advantage, the National League of Cities adds:
"[a) consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it
will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be
shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court
that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be
easier to channel iitigation concerning the validity and implications of a
consent decree into a single forum-thus avoiding the waste of resources
and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations." Brief for the Na- J
tiona! League of Cities, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
25.
For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become wi I used as devices to facilitate settlement. n eed, we have little doubt that the interpretation of§ 706(g) proposed by the Union and the Solicitor General would
12

I
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III
Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, supra, and Railway
Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961), Local 93-again
joined by the Solicitor General-contends that we have recognized as a general principle that a consent decree cannot
provide greater relief than a court could have decreed after a
trial. They urge that even if§ 706(g) does not directly invalidate the consent decree, that decree is nonetheless void because the District Court "would have been powerless to order
[such an injunction] under Title VII, had the matter actually
gone to trial." Brief for Petitioner 17.
We concluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent
decree of race-conscious relief that may "benefit non-victims
dlJes not-viOlate the con essionaf objectives of§ 706(g). It
is erefore ar to understand tne as1s for an in ependent
judicial canon or "common-law" of consent decrees that would
give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway.
To be sure, a federal court is more than "a recorder of contracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is "an
organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions
" 1B Moore, Lucas & Currier, Moore's Federal Practice ~ 0.409[5], at p. 331 (2d ed. 1984) (hereinafter Moore).
Accordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to
resolve ~e within the court' s subject-matter jurisdiction. Y urthermore, consistent with this requirement, the
consent decree must "come[] within the general scope of the
case made by the pleadings," Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum,
101 U. S. 289, 297 (1879), and must further the objectives of
the law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CAlO 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (CADC 1983),
make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary
to the expressed congression.al preference for voluntary remedial action.
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cert. denied,-- U. S. - - (1984). However, in addition
to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties' consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 1127-1128; Note, The Consent
Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 (1959). Therefore,_ ~ fed~ral
court-isnot barred from enterin a consent decree merely because the decree provi es broader relief than the court could
ha\Te1iWarded ane?a tfial. See, e. g-:;-Facific R ailroad v.
Ketc1tu m, supra, at '295-297; Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928) (Swift!) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a
Better Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 1127-1130;
Sansom Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539
(CA3), cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1984); Turner v. Orr,
759 F. 2d 817, 825-826 (CAS 1985). 13
Local 93 argues that Railway Employees v. Wright and
Firefighters v. Stotts establish a ,pifferent rule. But those ·
cases_dealt with the 'modification of a consent decree over the
ob~f a party, not wiEhthe initial aaoption of a decree
at the parties' request. As one commentato~ has noted,
om uestions about the '6riginal decree to questions
movin
about its modification raises "ent1re y 1 erent consideratioils:::Conslclerati-;;hs
that derive both from tne historic role
___.,
of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of the
injunctive relief itself." Htmdler, Twenty-Fourth Annual
Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972) (hereinafter Handler). These considerations distinguish cases involving the court's power to make disputed modifications of a consent decree.
Courts have traditionally recognized that because "an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing
13

We do not hold that a federal court is required to approve such a consent decree. We need not address here what grounds might justify a
court's refusal to enter a consent decree in a particular case.
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court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers
and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief," the court retains power to modify or vacate
injunctions when necessary. Railway Employees v. Wright,
364 U. S. , at 647; Handler 24. Moreover, this power inheres
in the court's equitable authority whether an injunction was
decreed by consent or after litigation:
"Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very
terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with
its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted,
power there still would be by force of principles inherent
in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always
to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The
result is all one whether the decree has been entered
after litigation or by consent. In either event, a court
does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that what it has been doing has been
turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong." Swift II, 286 U. S., at 114-115 (citations omitted).
At the same time, countervailing policies of finality and res
judicata have led to limitations on this power that insure its
cautious exercise. Thus, in declining to modify a consent decree entered between the Federal Government and numerous meat-packing companies, Justice Cardozo stated:
"There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of
the inquiry proper to the case before us. We are asking
ourselves whether anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction,
whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment
in its application to the conditions that existed at its
making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the
guise of readjusting. Life is never static, and the passing of a decade has .brought changes to the grocery busi-

•
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ness as it has to every other. The inquiry for us is
whether the changes are so important that dangers, once
substantial have become attenuated to a shadow. No
doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is
relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme
and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are
the victims of oppression; Nothing less than a clear
showing of grevious wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." ld., at 119.
The party seeking modification of a consent decree thus
must adduce evidence showing that circu'Ii1stariCeS are sufficiently altered to justify changing the terms of the decree.
See also, Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). If
the movant meets this heavy burden, the court may make the
modification even over the objection of other parties to the
decree, resting continued imposition of legal restraint on the
strength of the original consent because that initial agreement necessarily required recognition of the court's power to
modify. Swift II, supra, at 114. Nevertheless, completely
new circumstances prevail with respect to the new term. As
to that term there has never been an agreement among the
parties, and it would put too much into their initial consent to
suppose that it authorized the court to impose any and every
particular form of relief that might seem appropriate to the
court at some future date. Unable to rely on the parties'
consent, the court must rely entirely on the underlying statute for authority with respect to the modified term. In
other words , while the parties' original consent empowered
the court to issue an injunction that incorporated broader relief than could have been awarded after a trial, the absence of
such consent in contested proceedings to modify the decree
limits the court's remedial power to what is authorized by the
statute upon which the elaim was originally based .

.,

:,
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These principles both explain and distinguish the cases relied upon by the Union. In Firefighters v. Stotts, supra, the
plaintiffs and the City of Memphis entered into a consent decree that included the use of racial preferences for hiring and
promoting firefighters. After the decree had been in effect
for just over a year, budget deficits forced Memphis to layoff
a number of firemen. Because layoffs pursuant to Memphis'
"last hired, first fired" rule would undo the gains made by minority firefighters under the decree, the plaintiffs sought and
obtained an injunction requiring Memphis to modify its seniority rules to protect new black employees. We reversed.
We held first that the injunction could not be justified as necessary to enforce the terms of the consent decree. 467
U. S., at 572-576. The plaintiffs argued in the alternative
that the injunction was a proper modification of the decree.
We noted that
"a district court cannot enter a disputed modification of
a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting
order is inconsistent with that statute. Thus, Title VII
necessarily acted as a limit on the District Court's authority to modify the decree over the objections of the
City . ... " !d., at 576, n. 9 (emphasis added).
Because we concluded that the District Court would have
been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such
as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583; see also,
Local 28 v. EEOC, ante, at - - - - - , we rejected the
plaintiffs' argument and held that "the District Court was
precluded from granting such relief over the City's objection"
by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577, n. 9.
Railway Employees v. Wright, supra, also involved a disputed modification of a consent decree. In that case, a railroad and the unions representing most of its employees were
charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in
violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.
The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among
other things, the establishment of a union shop, a restriction

:,
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that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time.
When the Act was amended several years later to permit
union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree;
their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the railroad. This Court reversed the District Court's denial of this
motion, holding that refusal to modify constituted an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized
that "a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances,
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance
have changed, or new ones have arisen." 364 U. S., at 647.
The Court explained that such changes may be so significant
that not to modify the decree at the request of an aggrieved
party would be an abuse of discretion, and also that refusal to
modify an injunction was more likely to constitute an abuse of
discretion "when the new circumstances involve a change in
law rather than facts." I d., at 648. In fact, based on these
principles, the Court regarded as "established" the conclusion that, had the decree before the Court represented relief
awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion
to deny modification. Id., at 648-650. Therefore, citing
Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a consent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated decree, the Court reversed the denial of the Union's motion for
modification. I d., at 650-652.
Wright stands for the proposition that where one party to a
consent decree is entitled to a modification because a subsequent change in the law has altered the legal framework
within which a consent decree was originally negotiated, the
other parties to the decree "have no power to require of the
court continuing enforcement" of the injunction. I d., at
652. 14 This result is consistent with Swift II and with there•• Cf. also, ibid. (emphasis added):
"The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type
of decree a court can properly grant~ne negotiated with all those
strengths and infirmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact
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sult we reach today. There is dictum in Wright which suggests that a court lacks power to approve a consent decree
that contains anything not provided for in the law upon which
the underlying complaint is based. That dictum, however, is
contradicted in the opinion itself, which also contains language suggesting that, in adopting a consent decree, the
court is ordinarily free to accept or reject terms that are different from what is authorized by the statute. See id., at
651. 15 In any event, the dictum in Wright is inconsistent
with the many cases recognizing that parties may agree in a
consent decree to relief broader than a court would otherwise
be authorized to impose, supra, at--. Therefore, we decline to give it controlling significance.
IV
Local 93 and the Solicitor General also challenge the validity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered
without the consent of the Union. They take the position
that ecause t e nion was permitted to intervene as of
right, its consent was required before the court could approve a consent decree. This argument misconceives the
Union's rights in the litigation.
__.
A~rily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and
other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that
one party-whether an original party, a party that was
joined later, or an intervenor-could preclude other parties
from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing
from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to
present evidence· andhave its objectioiiSFleard at the' hearthat the court will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a
change in law or facts has made inequitable what was once equitable."
15
"Frequently of course the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted
without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a
change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives."

-----
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ings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not hg.ve
pow~~~~ts_ c~sent.

See Z~pes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,-465 U.-s:-385; 392,
400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional
Services, 711 F. 2d 1117,1126 (CA21983), cert. denied, 465
U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its
opportunity to P.41rticimte in the District Court's hearings on
the consent dec~ee. itwas permitted to air its objections to
the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant
evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objections and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly,
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it]
was due .... " Zipes, supra, at 400.
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through
sett~t may not dispose of the claims of t ir arty, and
a fortiori may not impose uties or obligations on a third
party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval
of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore
cannot dispose of the valid claims of non-consenting intervenors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be litigated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ~ 24.16[6], p. 181; see
also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843,
845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of
course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes
obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree.
See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327
(1964); Hughes v. United States, supra; Ashley v. City of
Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); 1B Moore ~ 0.409[5], p. 326, n. 2. However, the consent decree entered here does not bind Loc:Al 93
to do or not to do anYthing. It imposes no legal duties or
obligations on the Union at all; only the parties to the decree
can be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with its
terms. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S., at
676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does not purport to

,.. ~· '• ·..
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resolve any claims the Union might have under the Fourteenth Amendment, see ~nt v. Jackson Board of Education,-- U. S. - - (1986), § 703 of Title VII, see McDonald
v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, supra, or as a matter of contract, see
W . R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 756 , supra. Indeed, despite the efforts of the District Judge to persuade it to do so,
the Union failed to raise any substantive claims. Whether it
is now too late to raise such claims, or-if not-whether the
Union's claims have merit are questions that must be presente<ilrl tfie fi?stli1sranc~h has
retaineajurisdict1on t"o earsuccaeng:es:e only issue
beforeus is whether ~me District Court from
approving this consent decree. We hold that it did not.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

Dear Bill:

You

have

limited

whether a consent decree

the

issue

in

this

case

to

is an "order of the court" and

therefore subject to the limits of §706(g) of Title VII.
You conclude that a consent decree is not an order of the
court.
your

I will join your judgment and hope to join all of

opinion,

except Part

III.

I

do

have

a

number

of

suggestions, primarily for the purpose of clarification.
1.

You rely on Weber and cite it several times.

Weber has some relevance, but - as you note at p. 14 - it
involved
public

a

private

employer

employer

subject

to

while
the

this

case

Fourteenth

involves

a

Amendment.

Therefore, Weber does not answer one of the major issues
left open in your opinion for remand.

This could be made

clear by inclusion of language along the following 1 ines
(possibly on p. 14 where you are discussing Weber):

"Of course, Weber involved a private employer,
while this case involves a public employer
subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As we explained infra, at 28-29, we
leave
the
application
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
to
the
underlying
agreement for
resolution on remand."

There are a couple of places where I think that
it

would

be

though not

helpful

to

emphasize

limited by §706 (g)

that

the

City,

even

in agreeing to a consent

decree, is nevertheless limited in what it can agree to by
other

provisions

Amendment.

of

Title

VII

and

by

the

Fourteenth

I suggest the following additions:

1. On p.

12, line 4, I suggest substituting "The

Court holds" for "We hold."
2.

I suggest the folowing insert on p. 14, line

7, or perhaps in a footnote on the same page:
"This case, of course, involves a public employer
whose voluntary actions are subject to the
strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment as well
as to the limitations of §703 of Title VII. In
the posture in which this case comes to us, we
have no occasion to address the circumstances,
if any, in which voluntary action by a public
employer that is permissible under §703 would
nonetheless
be
barred
by
the
Fourteenth
Amendment. Nor need we decide what limits §703
places on an employer's ability to agree to
race-conscious relief in a voluntary settlement
that is not embed ied in a consent decree, or
what showing the employer would be required to
make concerning possible prior discrimination on

its part against nonwhites in order to defeat a
challenge by white employers based on §703. Cf.
Wygant. In any event, there may be instances in
which a public employer, consistent with both
the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in
Wygant and §703 as interpreted in Weber, could
voluntarily
agree
to
take
race-conscious
measures in pursuance of a legitimate remedial
purpose.
The only issue before us, therefore,
is whether, assuming arguendo that §706(g) would
bar a court from ordering such race-conscious
relief after trial in some of these instances,
§706(g) also bars a court from approving a
consent decree entered into by the employer and
providing for such relief."
3.

On p.

16,

line 3,

insert the following new

paragraph:
"Because this Court's cases do not treat consent
decrees as judicial decrees in all respects and
for all purposes, we think that the language of
§706(g) does not so clearly include consent
decrees as to preclude resort to the voluminous
legislative history of Title VII. The issue is
whether when Congress used the phrase "No order
of the court shall require" in §706(g) it
unmistakeably intended to refer to consent
decrees.
In addition to the fact that consent
decrees have contractual as well as judicial
features, the use of the verb "require" in
§706(g) suggests that it was the coercive aspect
of a judicial decree that Congress had in mind.
We turn, therefore, to the legislative history,
since the language of §706 (g) does not clearly
settle the matter."
4.

I suggest deleting the first sentence of the

paragraph on p. 17 and replacing it with the following:

"The legislative history pertaining specifically
to S706 (g) suggests that it was drafted with
this concern in mind and, in fact, that a
principal purpose of
the last sentence of
§706 (g)
was
to
protect
the
managerial
prerogatives of employers and unions."

I

also

hope

legislative

the

citation

history

to

in Local

28

the

discussion

following

this

of

the

sentence

will be deleted.
5. The last sentence of the paragraph on p. 17,
beginning "Thus, even if" should be changed to read:
"Thus, whatever the extent of the limits §706(g)
places on the power of federal courts to compel
employers and unions to take certain actions
that the employers or unions oppose and would
not otherwise take, §706 (g) by itself does not
restrict the ability of employers or unions to
enter into voluntary agreements providing for
race-conscious remedial action.
The limits on
such agreements must be found outside §706(g)."
6.
the

word

In

the

second

"latitude,"

sentence of footnote 9,

could

you

insert

the

words

after
"under

Title VII"?
7.
sentence

In footnote 10, I suggest deleting the second

and

replacing

it

with

the

following:

"Section

706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not employers or
unions,

and

focuses

on

preserving

certain

management

prerogatives from interference by the federal courts."

At

the end of the fourth sentence of footnote 10, replace the
period with a comma,
involving

and add

governmental

Amendment."

the words

employers,

by

"and,
the

in cases
Fourteenth

Then, following the citation to Weber, add a

citation to Wygant.
Part
speaks

III,

in

addition

to

addressing

Stotts,

rather broadly about consent decrees in general.

You may be entirely right, but I would not be comfortable
joining this section.
In sum, subject to the changes I suggest, I will
join your well written opinion except Part III.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan

June 19, 1986

84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

Dear Sandra:
Here is a draft of a letter to Bill Brennan that
incorporates suggested changes that 1 believe - if made would enable us to join all of Bi 11' s opinion except (in my
case) Part 111.
As the chanqe you want on p. 12, line 4, is not one
that 1 would require, and the change on p. 16, line 3, is
your idea, it occurs to me that perhaps this letter should
come from you rather than me. 1 do not, however, object to
these suggested changes, and so 1 am willing to send the
entire letter as drafted - though 1 would be happy to defer
to you.
Of course, we could write separately, making clear
that we do not disagree.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 19, 1986

No. 84-1999

Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

Dear Lewis,
Your letter looks fine to me. I am perfectly
willing to ask for the changes on p. 12 and p. 16 if
you prefer. I am also willing to join a separate
opinion stating we do not disagree with most of Bill's
conclusions. I leave it to you.
I note that on line 2, p. 3 of your letter,
the word "employers" should probably be changed to
"employees."
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

June 20, 1986

84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland

Dear Bill:
You have limited the issue in this case to whether.
a consent decree is an "order of the court• and therefore
subject to the limits of S706(g) of Title Vll. You conclude
that a consent decree is not an order of the court. 1 will
join your judgment and hope to join all of your opinion,
except Part 111. 1 do have a number of suggestions, primarily for the purpose of clarification.
1. You rely on Weber and cite it several times.
Weber has some relevance, but - as you note at p. 14 - it
involved a private employer while this case involves a public employer subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Weber does not answer one of the major issues left
open in your opinion for remand. This could be made clear
by inclusion of language along the following lines (possibly
on p. 14 where you are discussing Weber):
"Of course, Weber involved a private employer, while this case involves a public employer subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. As we explained infra, at
28-29, we leave the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the underlying agreement
for resolution on remand."
There are a couple of places where I think that it
would be helpful to emphasize that the City, even though not
limited by S706(g) in agreeing to a consent decree, is nevertheless limited in what it can agree to by other provisions of Title VII and by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 suggest the following additions:
2. On p. 12, line 4, 1 suggest substituting "The
Court holds" for "We hold."
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3. 1 suggest the folowing insert on p. 14, line 7,
or perhaps in a footnote on the same page:
"This case, of course, involves a public employer whose voluntary actions are subject to
the strictures of the fourteenth Amendment as
well as to the limitations of S703 of Title
Vll. ln the posture in which this case comes
to us, we have no occasion to address the
circumstances, if any, in which voluntary
action by a public employer that is permissible under S703 would nonetheless be barred by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor need we decide
what limits S703 places on an employer's
ability to agree to race-conscious relief in
a voluntary settlement that is not embodied
in a consent decree, or what showing the employer would be required to make concerning
possible prior discrimination on its part
against nonwhites in order to defeat a challenge by white employees based on §703. Cf.
Wygant. ln any event, there may be instances
in which a public employer, consistent with
both the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted
in Wygant and S703 as interpreted in Weber,
could voluntarily agree to take raceconscious measures in pursuance of a legittmate remedial purpose. The only issue before
us, therefore, is whether, assuming arguendo
that S706(g) would bar a court from ordering
such race-conscious relief after trial in
some of these instances, S706(g) also bars a
court from approving a consent decree entered
into by the employer and providing for such
relief.•
4. On p. 16, line 3, insert the following new paragraph:
"Because this Court's cases do not treat
consent decrees as judicial decrees in all
respects and for all purposes, we think that
the language of S706(g) does not so clearly
include consent decrees as to preclude resort
to the voluminous legislative history of
Title Vll. The issue is whether when Congress used the phrase "No order of the court
shall require• in S706(g) it unmistakeably
intended to refer to consent decrees. In
addition to the fact that consent decrees
have contractual as well as judicial fea-
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tures, the use of the verb "require• in
S706(g) suggests that it was the coercive
aspect of a judicial decree that Congress had
in mind. We turn, therefore, to the legislative history, since the language of S706(g)
does not clearly settle the matter.•
5. 1 suggest deleting the first sentence of the
paragraph on p. 17 and replacing it with the following:
"The legislative history pertaining specifically to S706(g) suggests that it was
drafted with this concern in mind and, in
fact, that a principal purpose of the last
sentence of ~706(g) was to protect the managerial prerogatives of employers and unions.•
1 also hope the citation to the discussion of the legislative history in Local 28 following this sentence will be
deleted.
6. The last sentence of the paragraph on p. 17,
beginning "Thus, even if" should be changed to read:
"Thus, whatever the extent of the limits
S706(g) places on the power of federal courts
to compel employers and unions to take certain actions that the employers or unions
oppose and would not otherwise take, ~706(g)
by itself does not restrict the ability of
employers or unions to enter into voluntary
agreements providing for race-conscious remedial action. The limits on such agreements
must be found outside S706(g) ."
7. In the second sentence of footnote 9, after the
word •latitude," could you insert the words •under Title
Vll"?

8. ln footnote 10, 1 suggest deleting the second
sentence and replacing it with the followings •section
706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not emplovers or
unions, and focuses on preserving certain management prerogatives from interference by the federal courts.• At the end
of the fourth sentence of footnote 10, replace the period
with a comma, and add the words •and, in cases involving
governmental employers, by the Fourteenth Amendment.• Then,
following the citation to Weber, add a citation to Wygant.
Part 111, in addition to addressing Stotts, speaks
rather broadly about consent decrees in general. You may be
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entirely right, but 1 would not be comfortable joining this
section.
ln sum, subject to the chanqes 1 suggest, 1 will
join your well written opinion except Part 111.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~
No. 84-1999

LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO
C. L. C., PETITIONER v. CITY
OF CLEVELAND ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U. S. C. §2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent decree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who
were not the actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory
practices.
I
On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (the Vanguards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters
employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging
the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred
to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of
race and national origin "in the hiring, assignment and promotion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire Department." App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a
class of blacks and Hispanics consisting of firefighters already
employed by the City, applicants for employment, and "all
blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire
Department." I d., at 8.
The Vanguards claimed that the City had violated the
rights of the plaintiff class under the Thirteenth and
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Fourteeth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e
et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although the complaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and
work assignments, the primary allegations charged that
black and Hispanic firefighters "have ... been discriminated
against by reason of their race and national origin in the
awarding of promotions within the Fire Department." App.
11. 1 The complaint averred that this discrimination was effectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City.
The written examination used for making promotions was alleged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said
to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the
manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not
be near the top of promotion lists when positions became
available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority
advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new
promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the
effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from
certain litigation commenced in 1973.
As just noted, the Vanguards' lawsuit was not the first in
which the City had to defend itself against charges of race
discrimination in hiring and promotion in its civil services.
In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an action
'The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the
lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion
Chief, Assistant Chief and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter
must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written examination. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80%
of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a
place on a promotion eligibility list. Although rankings on the lists are
based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis
of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to
remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year,
and, as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full 2-year period. Promotions are made from the lists as positions become available.
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alleging that the Police Department discriminated against
minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City
ofCleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District
Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining
certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing minority hiring goals. In 1977, these hiring goals were adjusted and promotion goals were established pursuant to a
consent decree. Thereafter, litigation raising similar claims
was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in
a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a
consent decree imposing hir-ing quotas similar to those ordered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio, Apr. 25, 1975). In 1977,
after additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new
plan governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department.
By the time the Van guards filed their complaint, then, the
City had already unsuccessfully contested many of the basic
factual issues in other lawsuits. Naturally, this influenced
the City's view of the Vanguards' case. As expressed by
counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court:
"(W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleveland had eight years at that point of litigating these
types of cases, and eight years of having judges rule
against the City of Cleveland.
"You don't have to beat us on the head. We finally
learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do
to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city
to comply with the law fully .... " Tr. of Oral Arg.
41-42.
Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litigation, the City entered into "serious settlement negotiations"
with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980,
from Edward R. Stege, Jr., and Mark I. Wallach to Hon.
Thomas J. Lambros.
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. (Local 93 or
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Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland's
firefighters, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District
Court granted the motion and ordered the Union to submit
its complaint in intervention within 30 days.
Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document
entitled "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." Despite
its title, this document did not allege any causes of action or
assert any claims against either the Vanguards or the City.
It expressed the view that "[p]romotions based upon any criterion other than competence, such as a racial quota system,
would deny those most capable from their promotions and
would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from maintaining the best possible fire fighting force," and asserted
that "Local #93's interest is to maintain a well trained and
properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends
that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated
competency, properly measured by competitive examinations
administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of
Federal, State, and Local laws." App. 27, 28. The "complaint" concluded with a prayer for relief in the form of an injunction requiring the City to award promotions on the basis
of such examinations. I d., at 28.
In the meantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and
the City continued, and a proposed consent decree was submitted to the District Court in November, 1981. This proposal established "interim procedures" to be implemented "as
a two-step temporary remedy" for past discrimination in promotions. I d., at 33. The first step required that a fixed
number of already planned promotions be reserved for minorities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant,
3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promotions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to Assistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. I d.,
at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of
"appropriate minority promotion goal[s]," id., at 34, for the
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ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The proposal also required the City to forgo using seniority points as
a factor in making promotions. I d., at 32-33. The plan was
to remain in effect for 9 years, and could be extended upon
mutual application of the parties for an additional 6-year period. I d., at 36.
The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of
January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent
decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional
goals and to the 9-year life of the decree. In addition, the
Union protested the fact that it had not been included in the
negotiations. This latter objection particularly troubled the
District Judge. Indeed, although hearing evidence presented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the
decree, the Judge stated that he was "appalled that these negotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the
intervenors . . . ," and refused to pass on the decree under
the circumstances. Tr. 134 (Jan. 7, 1982). Instead, he concluded, "I am going to at this time to defer this proceeding
until another day and I am mandating the City and the [Vanguards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in
dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their particular problems." Id., at 151. At the same time, Judge
Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its
objections more specific to accomplish anything: "I don't
think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their position on the basis that, 'Well, Judge, you know, there's something inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not
fair.' We need more than that." Id., at 153.
A second hearing was held on April 27. Local 93 continued to oppose any form of affirmative action. Witnesses for
all parties testified concerning the proposed consent decree.
The testimony revealed that, while the consent decree dealt
only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned
by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to
make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to
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hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battalion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros
proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high number of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The
Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants
rather than 40, it could "plug in a substantial number of black
leadership that can start having some influence in the operation of this fire department" while still promoting the same
nonminority officers who would have obtained promotions
under the existing system. Tr. 147-148 (Apr. 27, 1982).
Additional testimony revealed that this approach had led to
the amicable resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Georgia. Judge Lambros persuaded the parties to consider revamping the consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta
plan. The proceedings were therefore adjourned and the
matter was referred to a United States Magistrate.
Counsel for all three parties participated in 40 hours of intensive negotiations under the Magistrate's supervision and
agreed to a revised consent decree that incorporated a modified version of the Atlanta plan. See App. 79 (Report of
Magistrate). However, submission of this proposal to the
court was made contingent upon approval by the membership
of Local 93. Despite the fact that the revised consent decree
actually increased the number of supervisory positions available to nonminority firefighters, the Union members overwhelmingly rejected the proposal. 2
2
The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magistrate's Report to the District Court:
"Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a
touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable recommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union's Executive Board would be given serious consideration by the general membership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit,
pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations, have again strained relations between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feelings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped
that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is
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On January 11, 1983, the Vanguards and the City lodged a
second amended consent decree with the court and moved for
its approval. This proposal was "patterned very closely
upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of
[the] Magistrate ... ," App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus
its central feature was the creation of many more promotional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically,
the decree required that the City immediately make 66 promotions to Lieutenant, 32 -promotions to Captain, 16 promotions to Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief.
These promotions were to be based on a promotional examination that had been administered during the litigation. The
66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split between minority and nonminority firefighters. However,
since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level
positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be
promoted. The decree further required promotional examinations to be administered in June 1984 and December 1985.
Promotions from the lists produced by these examinations
were to be made in accordance with specified promotional
"goals" that were expressed in terms of percentages and
were different for each rank. The list from the 1985 examination would remain in effect for two years, after which time
the decree would expire. The life of the decree was thus
shortened from nine years to four. In addition, except
where necessary to implement specific requirements of the
consent decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a
I d. , at
factor in ranking candidates for promotion.
A29-A38.
not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such
reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together,
without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals
rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engaging in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for
optimism at this time." App. 78.

·..
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Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph
16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning
compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. ld., at
A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdiction with respect to applications or claims made by "any
party, including Intervenor." ld., at A38. The decree imposed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93.
On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the members of the plaintiff class of the terms of the proposed decree.
In addition, persons who wished to object to the proposal
were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93
filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent
decree:
"Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly maintained that there must be a more equitable, more fair,
more just way to correct the problems caused by the
[City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be
unnecessary 'remedial' methods embodied in the law
have been explored and some have been utilized.
"Local #93 reiterates it's {sic] absolute and total objection to the use of racial quotas which must by their
very nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire
Service. Since this problem is obviously the concern of
the collective representative of all members of the fire
service, Intervenors, Local #93. {sic] We respectfully
urge this court not to implement the 'remedial' provisions of this Decree." App. 98.
Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and
necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still
failed to assert any legal claims against either the Van guards
or the City. 3
3
In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced
objections to the proposed consent decree in personal letters to the District
Court. The basis of their objections was the same as the Union's. App.
to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (Memorandum Opinion and
Order of District Court).
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The District Court approved the consent decree on J anuary 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that "[t]he documents,
statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April
1982 hearings reveal a historical pattern of racial discrimination in the promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department." App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland
A3-A4. He then observed:
·
"While the concerns articulated by Local 93 may be
valid, the use of a quota system for the relatively short
period of four years is not unreasonable in light of the
demonstrated history of racial discrimination in promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is
neither unreasonable nor unfair to require non-minority
firefighters who, although they committed no wrong,
benefited from the effects of the discrimination to bear
some of the burden of the remedy. Furthermore, the
amended proposal is more reasonable and less burdensome than the nine-year plan that had been proposed
originally." !d., at A5.
The Judge therefore overruled the Union's objection and
adopted the consent decree "as a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the claims raised in this action." Ibid.
The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for "all purposes of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th(e]
Decree upon the application of any party . . . ." App. to
Pet. for Cert. A38.
The Union appealed the overruling of its objections. A
panel for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
one judge dissenting. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F. 2d 479 (1985). The court rejected the Union's claim that the use of race-conscious relief was "unreasonable," finding such relief justified by the statistical evidence presented to the District Court and the City's express
admission that it had engaged in discrimination. The court
also found that the consent decree was "fair and reasonable to
non-minority firefighters," emphasizing the "relatively mod-
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est goals set forth in the plan," the fact that "the plan does
not require the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters or
the discharge of any non-minority firefighters," the fact that
the plan "does not create an absolute bar to the advancement
of non-minority employees," and the short duration of the
plan. I d., at 485.
After oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this
Court decided Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984).
"Concerned with the potential impact of Stotts," the Court of
Appeals ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs,
753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately concluded that Stotts
did not affect the outcome of the case. The court noted that
the District Court in Stotts had issued an injunction requiring
layoffs over the objection of the City, while in this case the
City of Cleveland had agreed to the plan. The court reasoned that even if Stotts holds that Title VII limits relief to
those who have been actual victims of discrimination, "[t]he
fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an injunction makes the legal basis of the Stotts decision inapplicable." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 4
Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The
sole issue raised by the petition is whether the consent decree is an impermissible remedy under § 706(g) of Title VII. 5
• The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the
injunction imposed by the District Court in that case "had the direct effect
of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority
workers," while "[i]n this case, the consent decree assured the integrity of
the existing seniority system." 753 F. 2d, at 486.
5
The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions:
"1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting
to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order
as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial?
"2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action
promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected
to represent all employees when said promotional scheme adversely affects
the rights and interests of the employees and awards relief to minority employees regardless of whether they were actual victims of past racial
discrimination?"
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Local 93 argues that the consent decree disregards the
express prohibition of the last sentence of § 706(g) that

"[n]o order of the court shall require the admission or
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual
as an employee , or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of
this title." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added).
According to Local 93, this sentence precludes a court from
awarding relief under Title VII that may benefit individuals
who were not the actual victims of the employer's discrimination. The Union argues further that the plain language of
the provision that "[n]o order of the court" shall provide such
relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in
addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the
Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII
litigation is invalid if-like the consent decree approved in
this case-it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit individuals who are not themselves actual victims of an employThe first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes
the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can conceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect
of the consent decree on petitioner's legal rights, neither the petition for
certiorari nor. the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than
whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII.
Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent decree was "reasonable," and then, after Stotts was decided , to whether the
consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District
Court's retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press whatever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at - .
Therefore, we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether
§ 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree.
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er's discrimination. The Union is supported by the United
States as amicus curiae. 6
We granted the petition in order to answer this important
question of federal law. 474 U. S. - - (1985). The Court
holds today in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, p. - - ,
that courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief under
Title VII that benefits individuals who were not the actual
victims of a defendant's discriminatory practices. We need
not decide whether this is one of those cases, however. For
we hold that whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court from
imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial,
that provision does not apply to relief awarded in a consent
decree. 7 We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
II
We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress
intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means
of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CA8
1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers "'to
self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history'"). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228
(1982); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757,
770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal EmployThe United States took exactly the opposite position in Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for United States and EEOC in
Steelworkers v. Weber, 0. T. 1978, Nos. 432, 435, and 436, pp. 26-38.
8

' We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is
intended to express a view as to the extent of a court's remedial power
under§ 706(g) in cases where that provision does apply. That question is
addressed in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, a t - .

I
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promulgated guidelines setting forth its understanding that "Congress strongly encouraged employers . . . to act on a
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems
which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity
.... " 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC:
"The principle of nondiscrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and
. the principle that each person subject to Title VII should
take voluntary action to correct the effects of past discrimination and to prevent present and future discrimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually
consistent and interdependent methods of addressing social and economic conditions which precipitated the enactment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be
encouraged and protected in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII." § 1608.1(c)
(footnote omitted).
It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to employers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination.
This was the holding of Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193
(1979). In Weber, an employer and a union agreed in collective bargaining to reserve for black employees 50% of the
openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant was commensurate
with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. After
considering both the purposes of Title VII and its legislative
history, we concluded that "[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law
triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been
excluded from the American dream for so long' constituted
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, raceconscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial seg-
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regation and hierarchy." /d., at 204 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we held that Title VII permits employers and
unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable race-conscious
affirmative action, although we left to another day the task of
"defin[ing] in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans." I d., at 208.
Of course, Weber involved a purely private contractual
agreement rather than a consent decree. But, at least at
first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distinguish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and
voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litigation.8 Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court's
order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under
28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines
Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary set8

Unlike Weber, which involved a private employer, this case involves a
public employer whose voluntary actions are subject to the strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as to the limitations of § 703 of Title VII.
In the posture in which this case comes to us, we have no occasion to address the circumstances, if any, in which voluntary action by a public employer that is permissible under § 703 would nonetheless be barred by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, as is explained below, infra, at 28-30,
we leave questions regarding the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the underlying agreement to further proceedings before the District Court. Nor need we decide what limits§ 703 places on an employer's
ability to agree to race-conscious relief in a voluntary settlement that is not
embodied in a consent decree, or what showing the employer would be required to make concerning possible prior discrimination on its part against
minorities in order to defeat a challenge by nonminority employees based
on § 703. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. - (1986). In any event, there may be instances in which a public employer,
consistent with both the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Wygant
and§ 703 as interpreted in Weber, could voluntarily agree to take race-conscious measures in pursuance of a legitimate remedial purpose. The only
issue before us is whether, assuming arguendo that § 706(g) would bar a
court from ordering such race-conscious relief after trial in some of these
instances, § 706(g) also bars a court from approving a consent decree entered into by the employer and providing for such relief.
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tlement of employment discrimination claims" under Title
VII. Moreover, the EEOC's guidelines concerning "Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," 29 CFR pt. 1608 (1985), plainly contemplate the
use of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary
affirmative action. See, e. g., § 1608.8. 9 True, these guidelines do not have the force oflaw, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they '"constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' I d., at 142
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no reason to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermissible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a consent decree.
Local 93 and the Solicitor General find a contrary indicator
in § 706(g), which governs the courts' remedial power under
Title VII. They contend that § 706(g) establishes an independent limitation on what courts-as opposed to employers
or unions-can do, prohibiting any "order of the court" from
providing relief that may benefit nonvictims. They argue
that a consent decree should be treated as an "order" within
the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force
and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely
for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent decrees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as
a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objection of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift II); third, lhat noncompliance
9
The EEOC has not joined the Brief for United States in this case.
The Solicitor General's brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney
General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), and the Federal Government in its capacity
as an employer, § 2000e-16.
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with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt
of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435,
440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.).
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement
of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420 U. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour &
Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we
have previously recognized, consent decrees "have attributes
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character
that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether
we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judgment," for we can do both. The question is whether, given
their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns
embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating
them as "orders" within the meaning of that provision.
Because this Court's cases do not treat consent decrees as
judicial decrees in all respects and for all purposes, we think
that the language of § 706(g) does not so clearly include consent decrees as to preclude resort to the voluminous legislative history of Title VII. The issue is whether, when Congress used the phrase "[n]o order of the court shall require"
in § 706(g), it unmistakably intended to refer to consent
decrees. In addition to the fact that consent decrees have
contractual as well as judicial features, the use of the verb
"require" in § 706(g) suggests that it was the coercive aspect
of a judicial decree that Congress had in mind. We turn
therefore to the legislative history, since the language of
§ 706(g) does not clearly settle the matter.
The conclusion in Weber that "Congress chose not to forbid
all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action" when it enacted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative his-
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tory, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned
to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discretion. Weber, 443 U. S., at 205-207. As originally enacted,
Title VII regulated only private enterprises; the liberal Republicans and Southern Democrats whose support was crucial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings
about the potential for Government intrusion into the managerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was
necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. I d., at 206.
Their votes were obtained only after they were given assurances that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms
are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible."
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. , pt. 2, p. 29
(1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of
Rep. Celler); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at
14314 (remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep.
McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than
seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more conservative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of
power in 1964 "were far more concerned to avoid the intrusion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard
would entail." Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65
Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra,
at 207-208, n. 7 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (1964) (remarks of Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating
about "'preferential treatment or quotas in employment' " because it believed that "'the problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level- closer to the American people and by
communities and individuals themselves'").
The legislative history pertaining specifically to § 706(g)
suggests that it was drafted with this concern in mind and, in
fact, that a principle purpose of the last sentence of § 706(g)
was to protect managerial prerogatives of employers and un'
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I ions. See H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
C. :J p. 11 (1963) (first version of § 706(g) preserving employer de10

fense of "cause"); 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964) (amending
this version to substitute "for any reason other than discrimination" in place of "cause"); id., at 2567 (remarks of
Rep. Celler, the amendment's sponsor, that the amendment's
purpose was "to specify cause"); id., at 6549 (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey that § 706(g) makes clear "that employers may
hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote for any reason,
good or bad" except when such decisions violate the substantive provisions of Title VII). Thus, whatever the extent of
the limits § 706(g) places on the power of the federal courts to
compel employers and unions to take certain actions that the
employers or unions oppose and would not otherwise take,
§ 706(g) by itself does not restrict the ability of employers or
unions to enter into voluntary agreements providing for raceconscious remedial action. The limits on such agreements
must be found outside § 706(g). 11
10

f

Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Although the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the same concern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental employers
that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector, there is also no
indication that Congress intended to leave governmental employers with
less latitude under Title VII than had been left to employers in the private
sector when Title VII was originally enacted. See generally, Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972).
11
Thus, we do not suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions
is outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on non-minorities.
We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail
Transp . Co ., 427 U. S. 273 (1976), and Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S.
193 (1979). Section 706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not employers
or unions , and focuses on preserving certain management prerogatives
from interference by the federal courts. The rights of non-minorities with
respect to action by their employers are delineated in § 703 of Title VII, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2, and, in cases involving governmental employees, by
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From this, it is readily apparent that consent decrees are
not included among the "orders" referred to in § 706(g), for
the voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most fundamental characteristic. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S., at 235-237; United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971); Hughes v. United
States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464
U. S. 900, 902 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). As we observed in United States v. Armour
& Co.:
"Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation.
Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose;
rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to
each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much
of those opposing purposes as the respective parties
have the bargaining power and skill to achieve." 402
U. S., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source
of the court's authority to enter any judgment at all. See
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (cannot enter consent decree to which one party has not consented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
More
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Weber, supra; Wygant v. Jackson
Board
of Education, 476 U. S. (1986).
\
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importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally
based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent
decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress
placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose
obligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of
Title VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are
created by a consent decree.
The features of consent decrees designated by the Union
and the Solicitor General do not require a contrary result.
The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered
after a trial obviously does not implicate Congress' concern
with limiting the power of federal courts unilaterally to
require employers or unions to make certain kinds of employment decisions. The same is true of the court's conditional
power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an
unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a
consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations
were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court. 12 Finally, we reject the argument that a
consent decree should be treated as an "order" within the
meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation
for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative history that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the
focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement
is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a collective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent
decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But
the difference between contractual remedies and the contempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with
respect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement
scheme--whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have
However, as is discussed below, the court's exercise of the power to
modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate
§ 706(g). Infra, at - .
'

2
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an agreement entered as a consent decree-is itself made voluntarily by the parties. 13 Thus, it does not implicate Congress' concern that federal courts not impose unwanted obligations on employers and unions any more than the decision
to institute race-conscious affirmative action in the first
place; in both cases the parties have themselves created obligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory compromise.

III
Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984),
and Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961),
Local 93-again joined by the Solicitor General-contends
that we have recognized as a general principle that a consent
decree cannot provide greater relief than a court could have
Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather
than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator
points out, "(p]ublic law settlements are often complicated documents designed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-ofcourt settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to
continuing oversight and interpretation by the court." Schwarzschild,
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887, 899. In addition to this advantage, the National League of Cities adds:
"A consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling
litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it
will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be
shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court
that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be
easier to channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a
consent decree into a single forum-the court that entered the decreethus avoiding the waste of resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations." Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Curiae 25.
For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become widely used as devices to facilitate settlement. Indeed, we have little doubt that the interpretation of§ 706(g) proposed by the Union and the Solicitor General would
make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary
to the expressed congressional preference for voluntary remedial action.
13
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decreed after a trial. They urge that even if § 706(g) does
not directly invalidate the consent decree, that decree is
nonetheless void because the District Court "would have
been powerless to order [such an injunction] under Title VII,
had the matter actually gone to trial." Brief for Petitioner
17.
We conCluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent
decree of race-conscious relief that may benefit nonvictims
does not violate the congressional objectives of § 706(g). It
is therefore hard to understand the basis for an independent
judicial canon or "common law'' of consent decrees that would
give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway.
To be sure, a federal court is more than "a recorder of contracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is "an
organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions
.... " 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal
Practice ~ 0.409[5], p. 331 (1984) (hereinafter Moore). Accordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Furthermore, consistent with this requirement, the consent
decree must "com[e] within the general scope of the case
made by the pleadings," Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101
U. S. 289, 297 (1880), and must further the objectives of the
law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CAlO 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Courtwright v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens
for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 231 U. S. App. D. C.
79, 87, 90, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (1983), cert. denied sub
nom. Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 1219 (1984). However, in addition
to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties'
consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See
Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better
Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 89-90, 718 F. 2d, at
1127-1128; Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of
Compromise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317

.
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(1959). Therefore, a federal court is not barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a tr · .
See, e. g., Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra, at 295-297;
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928)
(Swift 1) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Gorsuch, supra, at 89-91, 718 F. 2d, at 1127-1130; Sansom
Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539 (CA3), cert.
denied, 469 U. S. 1017 (1984); Turner v. Orr, 759 F. 2d 817,
825-826 (CAS 1985). 14
Local 93 argues that Railway Employees v. Wright and
Firefighters v. Stotts establish a different rule. But those
cases dealt with the modification of a consent decree over the
objection of a party, not with the initial adoption of a decree
at the parties' request. As one commentator has noted,
moving from questions about the original decree to questions
about its modification raises "entirely different considerations-considerations that derive both from the historic role
of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of injunctive relief itself." Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual
Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972) (hereinafter Handler). These considerations distinguish cases involving the court's power to make disputed modifications of a consent decree.
Courts have traditionally recognized that because "an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing
court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers
and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief," the court retains power to modify or vacate
injunctions when necessary. Railway Employees v. Wright,
364 U. S., at 647; Handler 24. Moreover, this power inheres
"We do not hold that a federal court is required to approve such a consent decree. We need not address here what grounds might justify a
court's refusal to enter a consent decree in a particular case.

<) •
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in the court's equitable authority whether an injunction was
decreed by consent or after litigation:
"Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very
terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with
its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted,
power there still would be by force of principles inherent
in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always
to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The
result is all one whether the decree has been entered
after litigation or by consent. In either event, a court
does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that what it has been doing has been
turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong." Swift II, 286 U. S., at 114-115 (citations omitted).
At the same time, countervailing policies of finality and res
judicata have led to limitations on this power that insure its
cautious exercise. Thus, in declining to modify a consent decree entered between the Federal Government and numerous meat-packing companies, Justice Cardozo stated:
"There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of
the inquiry proper to the case before us. We are not
framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether
anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong,
is not subject to impeachment in its application to the
conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting. Life is
never static, and the passing of a decade has brought
changes to the grocery business as it has to every other.
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers, once substantial have become attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not
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suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression.
Nothing less than a clear showing of grevious wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with
the consent of all concerned." !d., at 119.
The party seeking modification of a consent decree thus
must adduce evidence showing that circumstances are sufficiently altered to justify changing the terms of the decree.
See also, Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). If
the movant meets this heavy burden, the court may make the
modification even over the objection of other parties to the
decree, resting continued imposition of legal restraint on the
strength of the original consent because that initial agreement necessarily required recognition of the court's power to
modify. Swift II, supra, at 114. Nevertheless, completely
new circumstances prevail with respect to the new term. As
to that term there has never been an agreement among the
parties, and it would put too much into their initial consent to
suppose that it authorized the court to impose any and every
particular form of relief that might seem appropriate to the
court at some future date. Unable to rely on the parties'
consent, the court must rely entirely on the underlying statute for authority with respect to the modified term. In
other words, while the parties' original consent empowered
the court to issue an injunction that incorporated broader relief than could have been awarded after a trial, the absence of
such consent in contested proceedings to modify the decree
limits the court's remedial power to what is authorized by the
statute upon which the claim was originally based.
These principles both explain and distinguish the cases relied upon by the Union. In Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S.
561 (1984), the plaintiffs and the City of Memphis entered
into a consent decree that included the use of racial preferences for hiring and promoting firefighters. After the decree had been in effect for just over a year, budget deficits
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forced Memphis to layoff a number of firemen. Because layoffs pursuant to Memphis' "last hired, first fired" rule would
undo the gains made by minority firefighters under the decree, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction requiring Memphis to modify its seniority rules to protect new
black employees. We reversed. We held first that the injunction could not be justified as necessary to enforce the
terms of the consent decree. I d., at 572-576. The plaintiffs
argued in the alternative that the injunction was a proper
modification of the decree. We noted:
"[A] district court cannot enter a disputed modification
of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting
order is inconsistent with that statute.
"Thus, Title VII necessarily acted as a limit on the
District Court's authority to modify the decree over the
objections ofthe City . ... " !d., at 576, n. 9 (emphasis
added).
Because we concluded that the District Court would have
been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such
as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583, we rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that "the District
Court was precluded from granting such relief over the City's
objection" by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577,
n. 9.
Railway Employees v. Wright, supra, also involved a disputed modification of a consent decree. In that case, a railroad and the unions representing most of its employees were
charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in
violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.
The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among
other things, the establishment of a union shop, a restriction
that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time.
When the Act was amended several years later to permit
union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree;
their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the railroad. This Court reversed the District Court's denial of this
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motion, holding that refusal to modify constituted an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized
that "a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances,
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance
have changed, or new ones have arisen." 364 U. S., at 647.
The Court explained that such changes may be so significant
that not to modify the decree at the request of an aggrieved
party would be an abuse of discretion, and also that refusal to
modify an injunction was more likely to constitute an abuse of
discretion "when the· new circumstances involve a change in
law rather than facts." I d., at 648. In fact, based on these
principles, the Court regarded as "established" the conclusion that, had the decree before the Court represented relief
awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion
to deny modification. Id., at 648-650. Therefore, citing
Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a consent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated decree, the Court reversed the denial of the Union's motion for
modification. I d., at 650-652.
Wright stands for the proposition that where one party to a
consent decree is entitled to a modification because a subsequent change in the law has altered the legal framework
within which a consent decree was originally negotiated, the
other parties to the decree "have no power to require of the
court continuing enforcement" of the injunction. I d., at
652. 15 This result is consistent with Swift II and with the result we reach today. There is dictum in Wright which suggests that a court lacks power to approve a consent decree
that contains anything not provided for in the law upon which
15
Cf. also 364 U. S., at 652 (emphasis added):
"The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type
of decree a court can properly grant-one with all those strengths and infirmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact that the court
will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a change in law or
facts has made inequitable what was once equitable."
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the underlying complaint is based. That dictum, however, is
contradicted in the opinion itself, which also contains language suggesting that, in adopting a consent decree, the
court is ordinarily free to accept or reject terms that are different from what is authorized by the statute. See 364
U. S., at 651. 16 In any event, the dictum in Wright is inconsistent with the many cases recognizing that parties may
agree in a consent decree to relief broader than a court would
otherwise be authorized to impose, supra, at--. Therefore, we decline to give it controlling significance.
IV
Local 93 and the Solicitor General also challenge the validity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered
without the consent of the Union. They take the position
that because the Union was permitted to intervene as of
right, its consent was required before the court could approve a consent decree. This argument misconceives the
Union's rights in the litigation.
A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and
other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that
one party-whether an original party, a party that was
joined later, or an intervenor-could preclude other parties
from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing
from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to
present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have
power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent.
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392,
400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional
Services, 711 F. 2d 1117, 1126 (CA2 1983), cert. denied, 465
•• "Frequently of course the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted
without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a
change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives."
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U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its
opportunity to participate in the District Court's hearings on
the consent decree. It was permitted to air its objections to
the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant
evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objections and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly,
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it]
was due .... " Zipes, supra, at 400.
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through
settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and
a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third
party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval
of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore
cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be litigated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ~24.16[6], p. 181; see
also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843,
845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Products
Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of
course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes
obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree.
See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327
(1964); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); Ashley
v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); 1B Moore~ 0.409[5], p. 326,
n. 2. However, the consent decree entered here does not
bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything. It imposes no
legal duties or obligations on the Union at all; only the parties
to the decree can be held in contempt of court for failure to
comply with its terms. See United States v. Armour & Co.,
402 U. S., at 676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does
not purport to resolve any claims the Union might have
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U. S. - - (1986), § 703 of Title VII,
see McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273
(1976); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), or as a
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matter of contract, see W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757 (1983). Indeed, despite the efforts of the
District Judge to persuade it to do so, the Union failed to
raise any substantive claims. Whether it is now too late to
raise such claims, or-if not-whether the Union's claims
have merit are questions that must be presented in the first
instance to the District Court, which has retained jurisdiction
to hear such challenges. The only issue before us is whether
§ 706(g) barred the District Court from approving .this consent decree. We hold that it did not. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

84-1999

LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO
C. L. C., PETITIONER v. CITY
OF CLEVELAND ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent decree which provides relief that may benefit md1v1duals who
were nof1lleaCfua1v1ctims onne aerenaanrsCliscriminatory
--practiCes.-- ·
I
'
On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (the Vanguards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters
employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging
the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred
to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of
race and national origin "in the hiring, assignment and promotion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire Department." App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a
class of blacks and Hispanics consisting of firefighters already
employed by the City, applicants for employment, and "all
blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire
Department." I d., at 8.
The Vanguards claimed that the City had violated the
rights of the plaintiff class under the Thirteenth and
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Fourteeth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e
et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although the complaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and
work assignments, the primary allegations charged that
black and Hispanic firefighters "have ... been discriminated
against by reason of their race and national origin in the
awarding of promotions within the Fire Department." App.
11. 1 The complaint averred that this discrimination was effectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City.
The written examination used for making promotions was alleged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said
to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the
manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not
be near the top of promotion lists when positions became
available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority
advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new
promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the
effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from
certain litigation commenced in 1973.
As just noted, the Vanguards' lawsuit was not the first in
which the City had to defund itsel againstcharges -ofrace
dis~~imination -in -mr1ng-andprorrtotion in -its civil services.
--,.
In 1972, an organization
of black police officers filed an action

--·--

'The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the
lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion
Chief, Assistant Chief and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter
must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written examination. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80%
of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a
place on a promotion eligibility list. Although rankings on the lists are
based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis
of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to
remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year,
and, as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full 2-year period. Promotions are made from the lists as positions become available.
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alleging that the Police Department discriminated against
minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City
of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District
Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining
certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing minority hiring goals. In 1977, these hiring goals were adjusted and promotion goals were established pursuant to a
consent decree. Thereafter, litigation raising similar claims
was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in
a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a
consent decree imposing hiring quotas similar to those ordered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio, Apr. 25, 1975). In 1977,
after additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new
plan governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department.
By the time the Vanguards filed their complaint, then, the
City had already l.!!J.Successfull contested many of the basic

factu~uits.

~fftl"enced

the City's view o!the Vanguards' case. As expressed by
counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court:
"[W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleveland had eight years at that point of litigating these
types of cases, and eight years of having judges rule
against the City of Cleveland.
"You don't have to beat us on the head. We finally
learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do
to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city
to comply with the law fully .... " Tr. of Oral Arg.
41-42.
Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litigation, the City entered into "serious settlement negotiations"
with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980,
from Edward R. Stege, Jr., and Mark I. Wallach to Hon.
.
Thomas J. Lambros.
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. (Local 93 or
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Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland's
fire-tig-hters, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District
Court granted the~ and ordered the Union to submit
its complaint in intervention within 30 days.
Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document
entitled "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." Despite
its title, this document did not alle e any causes of action or
assert an c a1ms agams e1 er the an ar s or the City.
It expresse
e v1ew hat "[p]romotions based upon any criterion other than competence, such as a racial quota system, ~ ~
would deny those most capable from their promotions and
would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from maintaining the best possible fire fighting force," and asserted
that "Local #93's interest is to maintain a well trained and
properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends
that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated
competency, properly measured by competitive examinations
administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of
Federal, State, and Local laws." App. 27, 28. The "complaint" concluded with a rayer for relief in_the form of an inj~~on reqti!riiii~~-Jty to3._~~ on the basis
~ t rf.<...
of such examinafwns. ICt:;a.t 28.
.--- - __,
In tlrenneantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and
~
the City continued, and a proposea consent decree was submitted to the District Court in November, 1981. This proposal established "interim procedures" to be implemented "as
a two-step temporary remedy" for past discrimination in promotions. I d., at 33. The first step required that a fixed
number of already planned promotions be reserved for minorities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant,
3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promotions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to Assistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. I d.,
at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of
"appropriate minority promotion goal[s]," id., at 34, for the
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ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The proposal also required the City to forgo using seniority points as
a factor in making promotions. I d., at 32-33. The plan was
to remain in effect for 9 years, and could be extended upon
mutual application of the parties for an additional 6-year period. I d., at 36.
The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of
January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent
decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional
goals and to the 9-year 1 e o the decree.
n a di wn, the
Union proteste the act t at 1t had not been included in the
negotiations. T 1s latter objection particularly troub ed the
DistrietJudge. Indeed, although hearing evidence presented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the
decree, the Judge stated that he was "appalled that these negotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the
intervenors . . . , " and refused to pass on the decree under
the circumstances. Tr. 134 (Jan. 7, 1982). Instead, he concluded, "I am going to at this time to defer this proceeding
until another day and I am mandating the City and the [Vanguards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in
dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their particular problems." I d., at 151. At the same time, Judge
Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its
objections more specific to accomplish anything: "I don't
think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their position on the basis that, 'Well, Judge, you know, there's something inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not
fair.' We need more than that." Id., at 153.
A second he i
held o A il 7. Local 93 continued to ~~g_ID!-fu.!:m~~ion. Witnesses for
all parties testified concerning the proposed consent decree.
Tlie-testiiilOily revealed that, while the consent decree dealt
only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned
by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to
make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to
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hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battalion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros
proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high number of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The
Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants
rather than 40, it could "plug in a substantial number of black
leadership that can start having some influence in the operation of this fire department" while still promoting the same
nonminority officers who would have obtained promotions
under the existing system. Tr. 147-148 (Apr. 27, 1982).
Additional testimony revealed that this approach had led to
the amicable resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Georgia. Judge Lambros persuaded the parties to consider re- \
vamping the consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta
plan. The proceedings were therefore adjourned and the
matter was ref~:n:e4 to a United States Ma ·strate.
Counsel for all three parties participated in 40 hours of intensive negotiationsunaefthe Magistrate's supervision and
agt"eed to revised consent d cree that incorporated a modified version of the Atlanta plan. See App. 79 (Report of
Magistrate). H_~~er, submission o~_£!:OE2_~ to_!he
court was made contingent upon approval bytheme-moership
of Locaf93.'---ne-spitet1lel'actth~nt decree
actually Increased the number of supervisory positions available to nonminority firefighters, the Union members overwhelmingly rejected the proposal. 2
The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magistrate's Report to the District Court:
"Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a
touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable recommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union's Executive Board would be given serious consideration by the general membership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit,
pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations , have again strained relations between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feelings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped
that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is
2

.,
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On January 11, 1983, t e Vanguards and the cfty lodged a
second amended consent d r~~d moved for
its approval. This proposal was patterned very closely
upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of
[the] Magistrate ... ," App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus
its central feature was the creation of many more promotional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically,
the decree required that the City immediately make 66 promotions to Lieutenant, 32 promotions to Captain, 16 promotions to Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief.
These promotions were to be based on a promotional examination that had been administered during the litigation. The
66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split between minority and nonminority firefighters. However,
since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level
positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be
promoted. The decree further required promotional examinations to be administered in June 1984 and December 1985.
Promotions from the lists produced by these examinations
were to be made in accordance with specified promotional
"goals" that were expressed in terms of percentages and
were different for each rank. The list from the 1985 examination would remain in effect for two years, after which time
the decree would expire. The life of the decree was thus
shortened from nine years to four. In addition, except
where necessary to implement specific requirements of the
consent decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a
factor in ranking candidates for promotion.
I d., at
A29-A38.
not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such
reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together,
without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals
rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engaging in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for
optimism at this time." App. 78.
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Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph
16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning
compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. Id., at
A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdiction with respect to applications or claims made by "any
party, including Intervenor." Id., at A38. The decree imposed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93.
On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the members of the plaintiff class of the terms of the proposed decree.
In addition, persons who wished to object to the proposal
were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93
filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent
decree:
"Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly maintained that there must be a more equitable, more fair,
more just way to correct the problems caused by the
[City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be
unnecessary 'remedial' methods embodied in the law
have been explored and some have been utilized.
"Local #93 reiterates it's [sic] absolute and total objection o e use o racial guotas which must y eir
very nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire
Service. Since this problem is obviously the concern of
the collective representative of all members of the fire
service, Intervenors, Local #93. [sic] We respectfully
urge this court not to implement the 'remedial' provisions of this Decree." App. 98.
Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and
necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still
failed to assert any legal claims against either the Vanguards
or
y. 3
In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced
objections to the proposed consent decree in personal letters to the District
Court. The basis of their objections was the same as the Union's. App.
to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (Memorandum Opinion and
Order of District Court).
3

i3J~
h~

~_Lq~
~
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The District Court approved the consent decree on J anuary 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that "[t]he documents,
statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April
1982 hearings reveal a historical pattern of racial discrimination in the promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department." App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland
A3-A4. He then observed:
"While the concerns " articulated by Local 93 may be
valid, thEtuse of a- q~~or the relatively short
period of four years is not unreasonable in light of the
demonstrated history~nation in promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is
neither unreasonable nor unfair to require non-minority
firefighters who, although they committed no wrong,
benefited from the effects of the discrimination to bear
some of the burden of the remedy. Furthermore, the
amended proposal is more reasonable and less burdensome than the nine-year plan that ~ad . been proposed
~
originally." Id., at A5.
The Ju~_!E.~ef~e ~erruled the Union's objection and
adopted-the consentaecree~nd adequate resolution of the claims raised in this action." Ibid.
The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for "all purposes of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th[e]
Decree upon the application of any party . . . . " App. to
Pet. for Cert. A38.
The Union appealed the overrulin of its objections. A
panel for the -court o Appeals for the ixth ircuit affirmed,
one judge dissenting. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F. 2d 479 (1985). The court rejected the Union's claim that the use of race-conscious relief was "unreasonable," finding such relief justified by the statistical evidence presented to the District Court and the City's express
admission that it had engaged in discrimination. The court
also found that the consent decree was "fair and reasonable to
non-minority firefighters," emphasizing the "relatively mod-
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est goals set forth in the plan," the fact that "the plan does
not require the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters or
the discharge of any non-minority firefighters," the fact that
the plan "does not create an absolute bar to the advancement
of non-minority employees," and the short duration of the
plan. I d., at 485.
Mter oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this
Court 'decided Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984).
"Concerned with the potential impact of Stotts," the Court of
Appeals ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs,
753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately concluded that Stotts
did not affect the outcome of the case. The court noted that
the District Court in Stotts had issued an injunction requiring
layoffs over the objection of the City, while in this case the
City of Cleveland had agreed to the plan. The court reasoned that even if Stotts holds that Title VII limits relief to
those who have been actual victims of discrimination, "[t]he
fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an injunction makes the legal basis of the Stotts decision inapplicable." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 4
Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The
sole issue raised b the petition is whether the consent decree is an 1mpermiss1 e reme~er § 7Q6(gL_of
Title VIJ.S
---------..
___........____~-.-~

• The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the
injunction imposed by the District Court in that case "had the direct effect
of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority
workers," while "[i]n this case, the consent decree assured the integrity of
the existing seniority system." 753 F . 2d, at 486.
5
The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions:
"1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting
to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order
as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial?
"2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action
promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected
to represent all employees when said promotional scheme adversely affects
the rights and interests of the employees and awards relief to minority employees regardless of whether they were actual victims of past racial
discrimination?"

'

/~~~-~:~
~~
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Local 93 argues that ~h~onsent decree disregards the
exp~i~~-l~st_~n~~~~~o~~ :o6.~g) tliat
"[nLo-~ of the court shall reQ..JiJre the admission or
reinsti:~nt of an individual as a memoer of a union, or
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individwl
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay,
jf such individual was refused admission, suspended, or
expelled, or was ·refused employment or advancement or
was suspended or discharged for any reason oth!!_r thp,n
discrimination on account of ra:ce, color, religion, sex,
or nationa10rlg1n orin violation of section 2000e-3(a) of
this title." 42 U.S. C. §2000e-5(g) (emphasis added).
According to Local 93, this sentence recludes a court from
awarding relief under Title V t at may benefit individuals
who were no~ of the emp~mina
tion. - The Union argues further that the plain language of
theProvision that "[n]o order of the court" shall provide such
relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in
addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the
Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII
litigation is invalid if-like the consent decree approved in
this case--it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit individuals who are not themselves actual victims of an employThe first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes
the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can conceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect
of the consent decree on petitioner's legal rights, neither the petition for
certiorari nor the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than
whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII.
Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent decree was "reasonable," and then, after Stotts was decided, to whether the
consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District
Court's retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press whatever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at - -.
Therefore, we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether
§ 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree.

~J-~
'r

~>if

~;; .u-? I~
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er's discrimination. The Union is supported by the United
States as amicus curiae. 6
We granted the petition in order to answer this important
questionOf1'eaeratlaW-:-' 474 U. S. - - (1985). WU!gld
to~ay_.ig__.~'_~ee£.M_et~s_rs v. F}_§_QQ, ante, p. - - , _Qlat
courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief under Title
Viftliatbenefits individuals who were not the adual victims
ofa defendant's discrimmator practices. r/W e need not decide w ether t is 1s one of those cases, however~ £pr we }
h0ldtllatwl1et~recludes a court from 1mposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, that
prov~~does not a 1 to relief awarded in a consent decree. 7 We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
II
We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress
intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means
of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CAS
1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers "'to
self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history"'). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228
(1982); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757,
770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal Employ6
The United States took exactly the opposite position in Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for United States and EEOC in
Steelworkers v. Weber, 0. T. 1978, Nos. 432, 435, and 436, pp. 26-38.
'We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is
intended to express a view as to the extent of a court's remedial power
under§ 706(g) in cases where that provision does apply. That question is
addressed in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, a t - .

•
84-1999-0PINION
FIREFIGHTERS v. CLEVELAND

13

ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promulgated guidelines setting forth its understanding that "Congress strongly encouraged employers . . . to act on a
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems
which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity
.... " 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC:
"The principle of nondiscrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and
the principle that each person subject to Title VII should
tal}e voluntary action to correct the effects of past discriminatio;'-·: na' to prevent present and future discrimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually
consistent and interdependent methods of addressing social and economic conditions which precipitated the enactment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be
encouraged and protected in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII." § 1608.1(c)
(footnote omitted).
It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to employers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination.
This was the holding of Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193
(1979). In Weber, an employer and a unToilagreed in collective bargaining to reserve for black employees 50% of the
openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant was commensurate
with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. After
considering both the purposes of Title VII and its legislative
history, we concluded that "(i]t ~o!}ic indeed if a law
triggered by a Nation's concernovercentUrie'SO'fracutl injuStice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been
excluded from the American dream for so long' constituted
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntar
rivate, raceconscious efforts to aoolish traditional atterns of racial seg-----------------·-~------------
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regation and hierarchy." I d., at 204 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we held that Title VII permits employers and
unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable race-conscious
affirmative action, although we left to another day the task of
"defin[ing] in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans." I d., at 208.
Of course, Webe'C_inv_9..!_ved,__a~_E!'iv~te _contractual ( l1frlI
agreement rather than a consent decree. - Bl:if,lifl:east at
first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distinguish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and
voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litigation. Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court's
order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under
28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines
Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims" under Title
VII. Moreover, the EEOC's guidelines concerning "Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," 29 CFR pt. 1608 (1985), plainly contemplate the
use of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary
affirmative action. See, e. g., § 1608.8. 8 True, these guidelines do not have the force oflaw, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they "'constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' I d., at 142
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no reason to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action
such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermisThe EEOC has not joined the Brief for United States in this case.
The Solicitor General's brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney
General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII,
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the Federal Government in its capacity
as an employer, § 2000e-16.
8
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sible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a consent decree.
Local 93 and the Solicitor General find a contrary indicator
in § 706(g), which governs the courts' remedial power under
Title VII. They contend that § 706(g) establishes an independent limitation on what courts-as opposed to employers
or unions-can do, prohibiting any "order of the court" from
providing relief that may benefit nonvictims. They argue
that a consent decree should be treated as an "order" within
the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force
and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely
for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent decrees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as
a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to modify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objection of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift II); third, that noncompliance
with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt
of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435,
440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.).
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement
of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble contracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
420 U. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour &
Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we
have previously recognized, consent decrees "have attributes
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character
that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether
we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judgment," for we can do both. The question is whether, given
their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns
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embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating
them as "orders" within the meaning of that provision.
The conclusion in Weber that "Congress chose not to forbid
all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action" when it enacted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative history, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned
to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discretion. Weber, 443 U. S., at 205-207. As originally enacted,
Title VII regulated only private enterprises; the liberal Republicans and Southern Democrats whose support was crucial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings
about the potential for Government intrusion into the managerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was
necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. I d., at 206.
Their votes were obtained only after they were given assurances that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms
are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible."
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29
(1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of
Rep. Geller); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at
14314 (remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep.
McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than
seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more conservative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of
power in 1964 "were far more concerned to avoid the intrusion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard
would entail." Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65
Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra,
at 207-208, n. 7 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (1964) (remarks of Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating
about "'preferential treatment or quotas in employment'" because it believed that "'the problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level closer to the American people and by
communities and individuals themselves'").
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The legislative histo~~@_l!i~sp~i~Jy_ to § 706(g)
suggests that it~fted with fliis concern in m~in
fact, that Congress added the last sentence of § 706(g) specifically to protect managerial prerogatives of employers and unions.9 See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, at
~
- - - - - (discussing the legislative history). See also,
~"'tJ .Lo
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 11 (1963)
.J~r
(first version of § 706(g) preserving employer defense of
,,_, <~'.....--.
"cause"); 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964) (amending this
~
version to substitute "for any reason other than discrimina~A..~
tion" in place of "cause"); id., at 2567 (remarks of Rep. Celler, ~
, .. . }; I.M
the amendment's sponsor, that the amendment's purpose wa~~ ~~~~
"to specify cause"); id., at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey ol. ~
that § 706(g) makes clear "that employers may hire and fire,
promote and refuse to promote for any reason, good or bad"
except when such decisions violate the substantive provisions
of Title VII). Thus, even if the last sentence of§ 706(g) do~s
limit the power of federal courts to compel employers and unions to take certain actions that the employers or unions oppose and would not otherwise take, § 7~n- (
VL£....

cern~_9-.l?~~.~~tion

of--employers
or unions. '0
___ _.:.......-- .... _
,.....- ·,--....._.-,_,..-

9
Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Although the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the same concern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental employers
that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector, there is also no
indication that Congress intended to leave governmental employers with
less latitude than had been left to employers in the private sector when
Title VII was originally enacted. See generally, Subcommittee on Labor
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Comm. Print 1972).
10
This is not to suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions is
outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on non-minorities.
We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976), and Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S.
193 (1979). We hold only that such concerns were not the source of
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From this, it is readily apparent th_~consent aecre-e~ are
not included among thenor ers" referre~®, fOr
·"\~.
.
-the voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most fundamental cna_ric eristfc. ~s v. IT Corilinental Baking Co., 420 U. S., at 235-237; United States v.
Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971); Hughes v. United
States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 ~1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464
U. S. 900, 902 (1983) ~REHNQUIST, J., dissenti~ denial
of certiorari). As we observed in United States v. Armour
& Co.:
"Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case
after careful .E~~1atfon as produce agreement on
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation.
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation.
Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have aJ>urpose;
rather the ~ arties have ur oses, generally opposed to
each other, and t e resultant decree embodies as much
of those opposing purposes as the respective parties
have the bargaining power and skill to achieve." 402
U. S., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source
of the court's authority to enter any judgment at all. See
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (cannot enter consent decree to which one party has not consented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (REHN-

-----

------------

§ 706(g), which focuses on preserving certain management perogatives
from interference by the federal courts. The rights of non-minorities with
respect to action by their employers are delineated in§ 703 of Title VII, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2. See Weber, supra.
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QUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
More
importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally
based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent
decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress
placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose
obligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of
Title VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are
created by a consent decree.
The features of consent decrees designated by the Union
and the SOIIci'fO~t require a contrary result.
The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered
after a trial obviously does notimplicate Con- essr concern
~wer o e eral co~ to
require emp oyers or unions to make certain kinds of employme~ns. The same iSTrUeOfthec ou"ii'sc onditional
power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an
unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a
consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations
were created by agreement of the parties rather than imposed by the court. 11 Finally, we reject the argument that a
consent decree should be treated as an "order" within the
meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation
for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative history that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the
focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement
is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a collective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent
decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But
the difference between contractual remedies and the contempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with
respect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement
"However, as is discussed below, the court's exercise of the power to
modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate
§ 706(g). Infra, a t - - - .

?
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scheme-whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have
an agreement entered as a consent decree-is itself made voluntarily by the parties. 12 Thus, it does not implicate Congress' concern that federal courts not impose unwanted obligations on employers and unions any more than the decision
to institute race-conscious affirmative action in the first
place; in both cases the parties have themselves created obligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory compromise.

III
Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984),
and Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961),
Local 93--again joined by the Solicitor General-contends
that we have recognized as a general principle that a consent
2

Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather
than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator
points out, "[p]ublic law settlements are often complicated documents designed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-ofcourt settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to
continuing oversight and interpretation by the court." Schwarzschild,
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887,899. In addition to this advantage, the National League of Cities adds:
"A consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling
litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it
will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be
shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court
that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be
easier to channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a
consent decree into a single forum-the court that entered the decreethus avoiding the waste of resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations." Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Curiae 25.
For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become widely used as devices to facilitate settlement. Indeed, we have little doubt that the interpretation of§ 706(g) proposed by the Union and the Solicitor General would
make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary
to the expressed congressional preference for voluntary remedial action.
'
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decree cannot provide greater relief than a court could have
decreed after a trial. They urge that even if § 706(g) does
not directly invalidate the consent decree, that decree is
nonetheless void because the District Court "would have
been powerless to order [such an injunction] under Title VII,
had the matter actually gone to trial." Brief for Petitioner
17.
We concluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent
decree of race-conscious relief that may benefit nonvictims
does not violate the congressional objectives of § 706(g). It
is therefore hard to understand the basis for an independent
judicial canon or "common law" of consent decrees that would
give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway.
To be sure, a federal court is more than "a recorder of contracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is "an
organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions
.... " 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal
Practice 11 0.409[5], p. 331 (1984) (hereinafter Moore). Accordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Furthermore, consistent with this requirement, the consent
decree must "com[e] within the general scope of the case
made by the pleadings," Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101
U. S. 289, 297 (1880), and must further the objectives of the
law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CAlO 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Courtwright v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens
for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 231 U. S. App. D. C.
79, 87, 90, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (1983), cert. denied sub
nom. Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 1219 (1984). However, in addition
to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties'
consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See
Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better
Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 89-90, 718 F. 2d, at
1127-1128; Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of
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Compromise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317
(1959). Therefore, a federal court is not barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.
See, e. g., Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra, at 295-297;
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928)
(Swift 1) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Gorsuch, supra, at 89-91, 718 F. 2d, at 1127-1130; Sansom
Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539 (CA3), cert.
denied, 469 U. S. 1017 (1984); Turner v. Orr, 759 F. 2d 817,
825-826 (CA8 1985). 13
Local 93 argues that Railway Employees v. Wright and
Firefighters v. Stotts establish a different rule. But those
cases dealt with the modification of a consent decree over the
objection of a party, not with the initial adoption of a decree
at the parties' request. As one commentator has noted,
moving from questions about the original decree to questions
about its modification raises "entirely different considerations-considerations that derive both from the historic role
of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of injunctive relief itself." Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual
Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972) (hereinafter Handler). These considerations distinguish cases involving the court's power to make disputed modifications of a consent decree.
Courts have traditionally recognized that because "an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing
court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers
and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief," the court retains power to modify or vacate
injunctions when necessary. Railway Employees v. Wright,
364 U. S., at 647; Handler 24. Moreover, this power inheres
We do not hold that a federal court is required to approve such a consent decree. We need not address here what grounds might justify a
court's refusal to enter a consent decree in a particular case.
13
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in the court's equitable authority whether an injunction was
decreed by consent or after litigation:
"Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very
terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with
its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted,
power there still would be by force of principles inherent
in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always
to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The
result is all one whether the decree has been entered
after litigation or by consent. In either event, a court
does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that what it has been doing has been
turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong." Swift II, 286 U. S., at 114-115 (citations omitted).
At the same time, countervailing policies of finality and res
judicata have led to limitations on this power that insure its
cautious exercise. Thus, in declining to modify a consent decree entered between the Federal Government and numerous meat-packing companies, Justice Cardozo stated:
"There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of
the inquiry proper to the case before us. We are not
framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether
anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong,
is not subject to impeachment in its application to the
conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting. Life is
never static, and the passing of a decade has brought
changes to the grocery business as it has to every other.
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers, once substantial have become attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not
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suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression.
Nothing less than a clear showing of grevious wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with
the consent of all concerned." I d., at 119.
The party seeking modification of a consent decree thus
must adduce evidence showing that circumstances are sufficiently altered to justify changing the terms of the decree.
See also, Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). If
the movant meets this heavy burden, the court may make the
modification even over the objection of other parties to the
decree, resting continued imposition of legal restraint on the
strength of the original consent because that initial agreement necessarily required recognition of the court's power to
modify. Swift II, supra, at 114. Nevertheless, completely
new circumstances prevail with respect to the new term. As
to that term there has never been an agreement among the
parties, and it would put too much into their initial consent to
suppose that it authorized the court to impose any and every
particular form of relief that might seem appropriate to the
court at some future date. Unable to rely on the parties'
consent, the court must rely entirely on the underlying statute for authority with respect to the modified term. In
other words, while the parties' original consent empowered
the court to issue an injunction that incorporated broader relief than could have been awarded after a trial, the absence of
such consent in contested proceedings to modify the decree
limits the court's remedial power to what is authorized by the
statute upon which the claim was originally based.
These principles both explain and distinguish the cases relied upon by the Union. In Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S.
561 (1984), the plaintiffs and the City of Memphis entered
into a consent decree that included the use of racial preferences for hiring and promoting firefighters. After the decree had been in effect for just over a year, budget deficits
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forced Memphis to layoff a number of firemen. Because layoffs pursuant to Memphis' "last hired, first fired" rule would
undo the gains made by minority firefighters under the decree, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction requiring Memphis to modify its seniority rules to protect new
black employees. We reversed. We held first that the injunction could not be justified as necessary to enforce the
terms of the consent decree. I d., at 572-576. The plaintiffs
argued in the alternative that the injunction was a proper
modification of the decree. We noted:
"(A] district court cannot enter a disputed modification
of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting
order is inconsistent with that statute.
"Thus, Title VII necessarily acted as a limit on the
District Court's authority to modify the decree over the
objections ofthe City . ... " Id., at 576, n. 9 (emphasis
added).
Because we concluded that the District Court would have
been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such
as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583, we rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that "the District
Court was precluded from granting such relief over the City's
objection" by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577,
n. 9.
Railway Employees v. Wright, supra, also involved a disputed modification of a consent decree. In that case, a railroad and the unions representing most of its employees were
charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in
violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.
The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among
other things, the establishment of a union shop, a restriction
that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time.
When the Act was amended several years later to permit
union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree;
their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the railroad. This Court reversed the District Court's denial of this
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motion, holding that refusal to modify constituted an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized
that "a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances,
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance
have changed, or new ones have arisen." 364 U. S., at 647.
The Court explained that such changes may be so significant
that not to modify the decree at the request of an aggrieved
party would be an abuse of discretion, and also that refusal to
modify an injunction was more likely to constitute an abuse of
discretion "when the new circumstances involve a change in
law rather than facts." I d., at 648. In fact, based on these
principles, the Court regarded as "established" the conclusion that, had the decree before the Court represented relief
awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion
to deny modification. I d., at 648-650. Therefore, citing
Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a consent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated decree, the Court reversed the denial of the Union's motion for
modification. I d., at 650-652.
Wright stands for the proposition that where one party to a
consent decree is entitled to a modification because a subsequent change in the law has altered the legal framework
within which a consent decree was originally negotiated, the
other parties to the decree "have no power to require of the
court continuing enforcement" of the injunction. I d., at
652. 14 This result is consistent with Swift II and with the result we reach today. There is dictum in Wright which suggests that a court lacks power to approve a consent decree
that contains anything not provided for in the law upon which
14

Cf. also 364 U. S. , at 652 (emphasis added):
"The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type
of decree a court can properly grant--{)ne with all those strengths and infirmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact that the court
will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a change in law or
facts has made inequitable what was once equitable."
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the underlying complaint is based. That dictum, however, is
contradicted in the opinion itself, which also contains language suggesting that, in adopting a consent decree, the
court is ordinarily free to accept or reject terms that are different from what is authorized by the statute. See 364
U. S., at 651. 15 In any event, the dictum in Wright is inconsistent with the many cases recognizing that parties may
agree in a consent decree to relief broader than a court would
otherwise be authorized to impose, supra, at - - . Therefore, we decline to give it controlling significance.
IV
Local 93 and the Solicitor General also challenge the validity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered
without the consent of the Union. They take the position
that because the Union was permitted to intervene as of
right, its consent was required before the court could approve a consent decree. This argument misconceives the
Union's rights in the litigation.
A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and
other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that
one party-whether an original party, a party that was
joined later, or an intervenor-could preclude other parties
from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing
from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to
present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have
power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent.
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392,
400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional
Services, 711 F. 2d 1117, 1126 (CA2 1983), cert. denied, 465
5
' "Frequently of course the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted
without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a
change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives."
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U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its
opportunity to participate in the District Court's hearings on
the consent decree. It was permitted to air its objections to
the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant
evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objections and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly,
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it]
was due .... " Zipes, supra, at 400.
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through
settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and
a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third
party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval
of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore
cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be litigated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ~24.16[6], p. 181; see
also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843,
845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Products
Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of
course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes
obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree.
See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327
(1964); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); Ashley
v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); 1B Moore~ 0.409[5], p. 326,
n. 2. However, the consent decree entered here does not
bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything. It imposes no
legal duties or obligations on the Union at all; only the parties
to the decree can be held in contempt of court for failure to
comply with its terms. See United States v. Armour & Co.,
402 U. S., at 676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does
not purport to resolve any claims the Union might have
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U. S . - (1986), § 703 of Title VII,
see McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273
(1976); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), or as a
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matter of contract, see W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757 (1983). Indeed, despite the efforts of the
District Judge to persuade it to do so, the Union failed to
raise any substantive claims. Whether it is now too la£e to
raisesuchcl3rms:--<ITif not-whether the Union's claims
have merit are questions that must be presentedlii'tn.e first
in~Istnct our , w ic has retained JUrisdiction
to h~h~nly i~ before us is whether
§ 706(g) barred the District oliit rom approviiig- tiiis consen ecree.
e o
a It I no .
ere ore, t e judgpe ,
I
ment of the Court of /
·
Affirmed.
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